Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Virginia – Legal Defense

The facts and circumstances of each case are unique and therefore the fact that a law firm has obtained significant verdicts and results in other cases in no way guarantees that other cases will have similar results.

I’ve been charged with “possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Virginia,” I need a good criminal defense attorney who handles possession of a firearm cases by a convicted felon.

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Using Old Chief to exclude the name and nature of a substantially similar offenses in a Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon case.

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Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Va Code § 18.2-308.2 is one of the most devastating class 6 felonies an individual can be charged with in Virginia.  Not just because a second amendment right has been taken away from the person, but because you can face mandatory minimum time.  If you are charged with this crime and your prior felony occurred in the last 10 years, you must serve a minimum of two years if convicted.  If you were convicted of a violent felony as defined in Va Code § 17.1-805 at any time prior to being charged with this offense and you are subsequently convicted, then you will automatically receive the maximum punishment for a class 6 felony…5 years!

The Commonwealth has the burden to prove (1) that the defendant was convicted of a felony under any state or federal law and (2) that the defendant was in possession of a firearm or stun weapon as defined in 18.2-308.1 or explosive materials.  The first element of a felony conviction is typically a foregone conclusion and the Commonwealth can prove this introducing the indictment of the charge including what the charge was and when and where it occurred.

Under Va. Rule of Evidence 2:403 the court has the discretion to exclude evidence that would be substantially more prejudicial than probative.  While evidence is rarely excluded on this basis, particularly when introducing evidence of a required element of the offense, in the case of a possession of a firearm by convicted felon, a prior felony offense of a similar nature could certainly impact the jury in an unfairly prejudicial way.  ESPECIALLY, IF THE PRIOR CONVICTION WAS A POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A CONVICTED FELON!

In Old Chief v. United States, the United Sates Supreme Court was asked to address whether the particulars of a conviction are admissible in a firearm felon case, given an offer by the defense to stipulate to the fact that the defendant is a convicted felon.  The Court found that, given an offer to stipulate, the probative value of the particulars of the conviction was discounted and substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  The risk of unfair prejudice can vary from case to case but… “[w]here a prior conviction was for a gun crime or one similar to other charges in a pending case the risk of unfair prejudice would be especially obvious…” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997).

I had a recent case where it appeared that this issue had not been directly addressed in Virginia with respect to an offer to stipulate (see Boone v. Commonwealth 285 Va. 597 (2013)), and all negative case law preceded Old Chief (see Glover v. Commonwealth 285 Va. 597 (1986); see also Essex v. Commonwealth (18 Va. App. 168 (1994)).  After consulting with colleagues at the Richmond Public Defender’s office, I filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to the specifics of the prior conviction (which in my case was a federal firearm felon conviction). After review of the case law and brief oral argument, the court in my case found that Old Chief was very much on point and extremely persuasive and thus granted the motion and advised us to agree on an appropriate stipulation with the Commonwealth.

While it may initially seem unwise to concede an element of the crime, as I stated earlier, the fact that the defendant was a convicted felon was a foregone conclusion that would be easily proven by the Commonwealth.  The exclusion of the specifics of his prior felony meant that the jury could not see that the defendant was previously convicted of a similar crime in federal court ten years earlier.  There is no doubt that this information would have been extremely prejudicial to the client.  Once we were able to keep the specifics of his conviction out of evidence and focus simply on whether he was in possession of a firearm on that specific day, the case leaned more in our favor because the jury could not be distracted by the fact that he’d been convicted of the same offense in federal court.

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence and after closing statements, within 30 minutes the jury returned a not guilty verdict and freed my client from the burden of a 5 year mandatory sentence.  There is no doubt in my mind that had the jury learned that he had been convicted of a federal firearm charge previously, this would have been a much more difficult case.

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If you have been charged with a crime or you are appealing your conviction, you should contact us immediately.

Hull Street Law
a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 230-4200

Disclaimer

The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice and you should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney.  Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

Smell of Weed Often Gives Police Keys to Home

The odor of weed/marijuana wafting from a home gives police the warrantless-keys to a home. 

This area of the law will continue to change – eventually with legalization of marijuana, officers will not be able to use the smell of marijuana as a basis for a search without a warrant.  But until then…

In 2011, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the police should not be able to create exigent circumstances by knocking on the door or making their presence known in order to avoid the general requirement that they obtain a search warrant before entering a home. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859-62 (2011)(rejecting “police-created” exigency doctrine).  If police have probable cause and a reasonable belief that evidence is being destroyed they are permitted to enter a home without a warrant and conduct a search, even though they have created the exigent circumstances.

There is no fixed legal definition that fully captures the meaning of exigent circumstances. Courts consider the commonalities for cases providing exigent circumstances mixed with practical commonsense judgment when determining whether officers in a myriad of situations with varied fact patterns face exigent circumstances excusing a warrant before conducting a search.

While there is a rebuttable presumption that a warrant is required by the Fourth Amendment prior to a search, in King, the court explained “[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.'” Id. 131 S. Ct. at 1856. The Fourth Amendment’s text condemns only ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures, and does not expressly require warrants.  The rebuttable presumption can be overcome by judicially recognized reasonable exceptions.

The inquiry focuses on what an objective officer could reasonably believe.  Courts have found exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry and search where  the smell of marijuana wafting from a residence with the announced or obvious presence of the police would cause an officer to reasonably believe that a crime is underfoot and that the evidence (marijuana) would be destroyed if entry and search is not promptly made.

Each case is judged based upon its own unique facts.  In Evans v. Commonwealth, 776 S.E.2d 760, 766, (2015), the Virginia Supreme Court found officers justified entering a home where the smell of marijuana wafted from the home and the occupant interacted three times with the police in circumstances that increased the probable cause and exigency.  When the defendant’s mother opened the door, a cloud of heavy and extremely strong marijuana odors, some of which blew “like a gust of wind,” past police officers through the open doorway; then when the mother opened the door again in response to more knocking she suspiciously volunteered denial (“Ain’t nobody smoking weed in here”) and appeared nervous and shaking in the face of the obvious fact that police officers smelled marijuana odors blowing through the doorway and finally that she slammed the door in the face of police officers in response to their further inquiries with sounds of unspecified movement inside the apartment after the door was slammed shut and finally did not respond to the additional knocks on the door by the investigating officers.

Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC provides criminal defense in Central Virginia.  The law firm specializes in creative litigation and civil rights.  The law firm frequently litigates issues related to the Fourth Amendment in criminal and civil courts.

Contact the law firm immediately if you have been charged with a crime and there is an issue related to whether or not the Fourth Amendment was violated.

You need experienced counsel.  You should contact a lawyer with Hull Street Law  today.

Call

HULL STREET LAW
at
804-230-4200
to set up your initial consultation today.

 

Hull Street Law
a division of
Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-230-4200
804-230-4100 fax

 

 

 Disclaimer

The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice.  You should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney.  Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

Criminal Defense for Construction Fraud in Virginia

What is the difference between construction fraud and breach of contract under Va. Code 18.2-200.1?

The Commonwealth must prove 5 things to convict a person of construction fraud, namely that the contractor (1) obtained an advance of money from another person; (2) had a fraudulent intent at the time the advance is obtained; (3) made a promise to perform construction or improvement involving real property; (4) failed to perform the promise; and (5) failed to return the advance within fifteen days of a request to do so by certified mail to the defendant’s last known address or his address listed in the contract.

The fraudulent intent must exist at the time that the contractor procured the advance.  The contractor must fail or refuse to “perform” the promised work and to “substantially make good such advance.”  The Commonwealth must present additional proof that the contractor “fail[ed] to return such advance within fifteen days of a request to do so.”

Now on a technical but essential note, the request for the return of the advance may not include something different than an unqualified demand to return all or part of the original advance.  The Virginia Supreme Court explained the reason for such a strict reading of the statute, stating,

The construction fraud statute, Code § 18.2-200.1, was not meant simply to criminalize a contractor’s breach of contract. The statute instead criminalizes a species of fraud analogous to the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses….

The statute does not say that the notice can give the contractor other options — such as continued contractual performance at a reduced price, the return of something other than the advance, or the delivery of materials in lieu of a return of the advance. There are sound reasons for not overcomplicating the statute in such manner. If the contractor “fails to return such advance,” he “shall be deemed guilty of the larceny of such money” if the other requirements of the statute are also met. Id. The contractor, therefore, should not be misled into believing that anything other than a return of the advance would relieve him of the very real risk of criminal prosecution.

Bowman v. Commonwealth, 777 S.E.2d 851, 855-856 (2015)

The law firm of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC represents clients in matters involving construction disputes and litigation.  Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC represents defendants charged with construction fraud.

You need experienced counsel.  You should contact a lawyer with Hull Street Law  today.

Call 804-230-4200

Hull Street Law
a division of
Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-230-4200

 Disclaimer

The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice.  You should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney.  Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

Freaky Friday Halloween Decision – Drink and operate your car radio on your property may result in DUI conviction

Freaky Friday Halloween Decision by the Virginia Supreme Court.  The public is mystified by what it considers a new legal absurdity – Listening to your car radio in a private driveway while drinking is illegal and may result in a DUI conviction! Sarafin v. Commonwealth, October 31, 2014.

The odd conclusion in this DUI case is the result of the court’s deference to the General Assembly.  Rather than concluding that the General Assembly occasionally does a poor job drafting legislation, the court does its best to interpret the statute which from time to time results in legal absurdities.  The court bases its decision on rules of statutory construction.  The court states “[W]hen the General Assembly has used specific language in one instance, but omits that language or uses different language when addressing a similar subject elsewhere in the  Code, we must presume that the difference in the choice of language was intentional.”   This might have been a time where the presumption should have been rebutted.

The court declined to read § 18.2-266 (the DUI statute) to require that an operator of a motor vehicle be “on a highway” refusing to apply the legislative definition of “operator” under § 46.2-100 that defines “operator” as “every person who either (1) drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway or (ii) is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.”

The reason for rejecting this definition is that to do so would result in a separate absurdity.  § 18.2-266 reads in part, “It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train (i) while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more by weight by volume…”  The court points out that trains do not operate on public highways but on privately owned tracks and therefore reading in the “on a highway” language would make the trains provision meaningless.  (Unless of course the statute only restricts drunk train operating when the track intersects with public highways).

Secondly, in 1994, the General Assembly amended § 18.2-266, prohibiting the operation of “mopeds, … on the public highways of this Commonwealth” while the operator is intoxicated, and therefore since § 18.2-266 when referring to an automobile, it does not state “on the public highways of this Commonwealth” for operating “ it must have meant to differentiate the two.

The decision was split 4-3, with a very vocal dissent.   Justice Mims dissenting stated that the court had previously recognized the nexus or connection between § 46.2-100 and § 18.2-266 in Enriquez v. Commonwealth in 2012 when the court stated that “when an intoxicated person is seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle on a public highway and the key is in the ignition switch, he is in actual physical control of the vehicle and, therefore, is guilty of operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266.”  Without [the element of ‘on a public highway’], the Court has taken the final step toward construing Code § 18.2-266 to punish a person for merely occupying, rather than operating, a motor vehicle.”  Justice McClanahan, joined by Chief Justice Kinser also dissented, stating that the “on a highway” element has been the Court’s interpretation as far back as 1964, for similar reasons as Justice Mims.

 

You need experienced counsel.  You should contact a lawyer with Hull Street Law today.   Call 804-230-4200.

Hull Street Law
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804.230.4200
804.230.4100 fax

 Disclaimer

 The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice.  You should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney.  Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.