Freaky Friday Halloween Decision – Drink and operate your car radio on your property may result in DUI conviction

Freaky Friday Halloween Decision by the Virginia Supreme Court.  The public is mystified by what it considers a new legal absurdity – Listening to your car radio in a private driveway while drinking is illegal and may result in a DUI conviction! Sarafin v. Commonwealth, October 31, 2014.

The odd conclusion in this DUI case is the result of the court’s deference to the General Assembly.  Rather than concluding that the General Assembly occasionally does a poor job drafting legislation, the court does its best to interpret the statute which from time to time results in legal absurdities.  The court bases its decision on rules of statutory construction.  The court states “[W]hen the General Assembly has used specific language in one instance, but omits that language or uses different language when addressing a similar subject elsewhere in the  Code, we must presume that the difference in the choice of language was intentional.”   This might have been a time where the presumption should have been rebutted.

The court declined to read § 18.2-266 (the DUI statute) to require that an operator of a motor vehicle be “on a highway” refusing to apply the legislative definition of “operator” under § 46.2-100 that defines “operator” as “every person who either (1) drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway or (ii) is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.”

The reason for rejecting this definition is that to do so would result in a separate absurdity.  § 18.2-266 reads in part, “It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train (i) while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more by weight by volume…”  The court points out that trains do not operate on public highways but on privately owned tracks and therefore reading in the “on a highway” language would make the trains provision meaningless.  (Unless of course the statute only restricts drunk train operating when the track intersects with public highways).

Secondly, in 1994, the General Assembly amended § 18.2-266, prohibiting the operation of “mopeds, … on the public highways of this Commonwealth” while the operator is intoxicated, and therefore since § 18.2-266 when referring to an automobile, it does not state “on the public highways of this Commonwealth” for operating “ it must have meant to differentiate the two.

The decision was split 4-3, with a very vocal dissent.   Justice Mims dissenting stated that the court had previously recognized the nexus or connection between § 46.2-100 and § 18.2-266 in Enriquez v. Commonwealth in 2012 when the court stated that “when an intoxicated person is seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle on a public highway and the key is in the ignition switch, he is in actual physical control of the vehicle and, therefore, is guilty of operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266.”  Without [the element of ‘on a public highway’], the Court has taken the final step toward construing Code § 18.2-266 to punish a person for merely occupying, rather than operating, a motor vehicle.”  Justice McClanahan, joined by Chief Justice Kinser also dissented, stating that the “on a highway” element has been the Court’s interpretation as far back as 1964, for similar reasons as Justice Mims.

 

You need experienced counsel.  You should contact a lawyer with Hull Street Law today.   Call 804-230-4200.

Hull Street Law
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804.230.4200
804.230.4100 fax

 Disclaimer

 The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice.  You should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney.  Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

Virginia DUI Defense – Free Consultation

804-230-4200
VIRGINIA DUI DEFENSE – CALL FOR FREE CONSULTATION 

At Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C., we realize the seriousness of being arrested for DUI, or DWI as it is sometimes referred to.  When you are in need of a capable Virginia, DUI lawyer, count on Hull Street Law for strong and effective legal counsel.  Even if it is your first offense, you are facing a mandatory minimum fine of $250 and possible jail time depending on your blood alcohol level.  Penalties become increasingly harsh with every subsequent offense.  Our Virginia, Va DWI attorneys are skilled in this complex area of the law; we will work to obtain the very best outcome possible on your behalf.

In the Commonwealth of Virginia, there are generally three methods that are used to determine that an individual was intoxicated while operating a vehicle.  Your driving behavior (i.e. weaving, driving recklessly, etc.), field sobriety tests and breath/blood alcohol tests are typically used to determine that you were driving while under the influence.  Our Virginia DUI lawyers are experienced and knows that these tests are not always perfect, the results not always reliable.

Did the police officer have reasonable suspicion to pull you over?  The results of field sobriety tests are not always indisputable, and there are many problems with breath/blood tests.  The individual who administers these tests must be licensed; tests must be handled properly.  Results are not always accurate.  Your Va DWI attorney will know how to challenge the evidence against you, and build a strong defense if it becomes necessary to go to court.

Being convicted on charges of driving while intoxicated can negatively impact your life in many ways.  Not only are the fines steep, your reputation or career may be affected.  Many employers do not want an employee on their payroll who has a criminal record.  Your insurance rates will likely increase; if you are a repeat offender, your insurance provider may drop coverage altogether.  Your license will be suspended, and you will need to get a restricted license so that you can drive under certain circumstances, such as to go to and from work or school.  A trusted Va DUI attorney can explain all of the details to you, and answer any questions you may have.

Whether you are innocent or guilty of the charges leveled against you, it is critical that you have a qualified Va DWI lawyer on your side.  This is a serious criminal offense, and one that requires legal support and guidance. An experienced attorney will work to have the charges against you reduced so that the consequences you face are less severe, or to have them completely dismissed when possible.  At Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C., with two offices in the Capital of Virginia, our Va DWI lawyers are aggressive and skilled, ready to do whatever is necessary to protect your rights, reputation and freedom.  Contact one of our VIRGINIA DUI lawyers today for a free consultation:

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Expungement of Police and Court Record in Virginia

Expungement of Police and Court Record in Virginia

            An arrest for a criminal offense can have a devastating impact on your life, including, but not limited to, termination from your job, denial of future employment, loss or denial of financial aid for college, and loss of your home. Therefore, it is vital to ensure that police and court records accurately reflect your criminal history. You should take steps to expunge (“remove”) any inaccuracies and/or incidents that overstate your criminal history.  You should take steps to expunge charges for which you were not convicted.

            In many states, a person previously convicted of a criminal offense is eligible to expunge the record of his or her conviction and arrest after the passage of a specified period of time and completion of other statutory requirements (i.e. Illinois, Michigan, Oklahoma, etc.). However, in Virginia, one’s eligibility for expungement is severely limited. The most noteworthy of these limitations is that an individual cannot seek an expungement for an offense for which he or she has pled guilty, received a dismissal based upon a deferred disposition, or for which he or she was convicted.

Under Virginia Code § 19.2-392.2, a person qualifies for an expungement if he or she is acquitted of a criminal offense, the Commonwealth takes a nolle prosequi (Latin for “be unwilling to pursue” or “will not prosecute”) the criminal charge, or “is otherwise dismissed.” Additionally, a person is eligible for an expungement of a criminal offense upon presenting evidence to the court that the criminal charge arose as a result of identity theft. Again, please note that Virginia law does not permit expungement of offenses for which an individual pled guilty, was convicted, or received a dismissal upon completion of the terms of a deferred disposition where there is a finding of guilt.

In Necaise v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 666, 708 S.E.2d 864 (2011), the court held that a defendant cannot have a felony charge expunged when he pleads guilty to a lesser-included misdemeanor offense. Id., 281 Va. at 669, 708 S.E.2d at 866.  However when a person is convicted of a misdemeanor that is not a lesser included offense, an expungement may be possible, but it will be important to establish that the plead is not a “bargain”– the person must show that he was in fact not guilty and not just taking a deal.

“When considering a petition for expungement of police and court records relating to a criminal charge, ‘the threshold determination . . . is whether the petitioner has a right to seek expungement of those records under an applicable provision of Code § 19.2-392.2(A).’” Brown v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 92, 98-99, 677 S.E.2d 220, 223 (2009) (quoting Daniel v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 523, 530, 604 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2004)). Under that Code section, expungement of a criminal record is ordinarily permitted in three circumstances: 1) if a person is “acquitted” of a crime; 2) the criminal offense is ended by nolle prosequi; or 3) the charge is “otherwise dismissed.” See § 19.2-392.2(A)(1)-(2). “In any proceeding for expungement, the petitioner has the burden of establishing the existence of one of those three criteria as a prerequisite to his right to seek expungement.” Eastlack v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 120, 123, 710 S.E.2d 723, 724 (2011). “After concluding that a petitioner has the right to seek expungement under Code § 19.2-392.2(A), a circuit court must then determine whether ‘the continued existence and possible dissemination of information relating to the arrest of the petitioner causes or may cause circumstances which constitute a manifest injustice to the petitioner.’” Brown, 278 Va. at 103, 677 S.E.2d at 226 (quoting Code § 19.2-392.2(F)).

Ordinarily, the process for obtaining an expungement is fairly straightforward. Nonetheless, the legal process and procedure can be quite daunting. Therefore, if you are seeking an expungement, you should hire an experienced attorney to represent and guide you through the process. Mistakes can make the difference between a successful expungement and an unjustified criminal offense remaining on your record.

Call

HULL STREET LAW
at
804-230-4200
to set up your initial consultation today.

Contact the Firm!

Thomas H. Roberts, Esquire

Hull Street Law
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 230-4200 x 110

Disclaimer

The facts and circumstances of each case are unique and therefore the fact that a law firm has obtained significant verdicts and results in other cases in no way guarantees that other cases will have similar results.

The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice and you should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney. Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

What you need to know if you are being sued by your Homeowner’s Association

Are you being sued by your Homeowner’s Association?

Many people find themselves in trouble with their Homeowner’s Associations (“HOA”). Often times, it’s a simple thing like forgetting to pay the annual assessment on time. Other times, there are larger issues such as a patriotic former Marine attempting to fly the Stars and Stripes on his own property. Whatever the case may be, when a conflict arises between you and your HOA, you don’t have to take it lying down.

The rules governing the creation and operations of HOAs are complex. In Virginia, those rules are mostly embodied in The Virginia Property Owner’s Association Act (the “VPOAA” or “the Act”) Va. Code §55-508 et seq. This act regulates everything from which neighborhoods are subject to the VPOAA to what has to be included in a disclosure package at the time you purchase your home, to who has access to the association’s records. However, this act has also be supplemented and explained by case law from the Virginia Supreme Court. The complexity of this area of the law, which combines the law of contracts, real property, statutory construction, and state constitutional law requires an attorney with experience.

Any measure of non-compliance with the act, on the part of your HOA, may give you a leverage point. This sounds like a thin defense, but the consequences of non-compliance can be catastrophic for the HOA. For example, in one case the law firm recently handled, the HOA sued our clients (and nearly 30 of their neighbors) for back assessments. When the firm reviewed the case, it found that the non-compliance with the act was so significant that it threw the HOA out of the VPOAA altogether. That became the core point in our defense. This aggressive defense made continuing the lawsuit very risky for the HOA. Ultimately, the HOA backed down because if it had lost the case it would have been hard pressed in future cases to claim that it was an HOA under the Act.   For most of the other neighbors not represented by the firm, the HOA took judgments against them.

If you are sued by your homeowner’s association, you don’t have to merely pay up. You may have defenses of which you are unaware.

Call
HULL STREET LAW
at
804-230-4200
to set up your initial consultation today.

Contact the Firm!

Hull Street Law
1010 Hull Street
Richmond, Virginia 23224
(804) 230-4200

Disclaimer

The facts and circumstances of each case are unique and therefore the fact that a law firm has obtained significant verdicts and results in other cases in no way guarantees that other cases will have similar results.

The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice and you should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney. Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

Texting While Driving in Virginia: What Virginia Drivers Need to Know

Texting While Driving in Virginia: What Virginia Drivers Need to Know

On July 1, 2013, amendments to Virginia Code § 46.2-1078.1 (increasing fines and changing other regulations regarding “texting while driving”) became effective.

Texting While Driving In Virginia - Illegal

The penalties for texting while driving have been increased to $125 for the first offense and $250 for second or subsequent offenses. Additionally, if you are convicted of both reckless driving and a violation of § 46.2-1078.1, there is a mandatory minimum $250 fine. Obviously, no one wants to pay fines any more than they want to deal with the other consequences of traffic violations (like increased insurance costs, suspended driver’s licenses, etc.). So the question is: what exactly does it mean to “text” while you “drive” in Virginia?

Under the new law, it is a violation of 46.2-1078.1 if a person manually enters multiple letters into a handheld personal communications devise as a means of communicating with another person. It is also a violation to read text messages or emails transmitted to or stored on a handheld personal communications devise.

Because a violation of Section 46.2-1978.1 is now a so-called “primary offense,” you can be stopped by a police officer if he or she has any reasonable, articulable suspicion that you texted or are texting while driving (called a “Terry Stop”). By way of example, using your Google Maps app on your smart phone to obtain directions is not an offense. However, using Google Maps and using your texting app look very similar to the officer watching you from the side of the road, and may constitute articulable suspicion.  (Welcome to the growing police state authorizing more and more government intrusion into your life!)

Another complication is that we expect officers to begin to confiscate mobile devises as evidence. There is little to prevent this from happening. The following measures may offer you some protection: First, always ensure your phone requires a password to access information. Second, make the officer demand the phone from you. If he does, he has a right to it, but he may not know that. If he is only “requesting” the phone, don’t hand it over. Third, if your phone has a feature that will wipe all information after a certain number of incorrect log-in attempts or after a period of time, use it. DO NOT take any overt action to delete the information on the phone after you have been pulled over or after the officer has demanded you to hand over your phone as that would likely result in additional criminal charges.

If you are stopped on suspicion of texting while driving, remember your rights. You don’t have to consent to a search of your vehicle or person. If you are cited for texting while driving or any other traffic offense, call an attorney to protect your rights. You don’t have to plead guilty or pre-pay the fine. You may be able to avoid the long-term consequences of such a charge. While the texting while driving rule is broad and ambiguous, our firm has already done its homework and has found exceptions and defenses which may apply to you.

For legal representation at a fair price:
In Richmond, Powhatan, Chesterfield, Goochland, Petersburg,
Hopewell, Colonial Heights, Henrico, & Hanover and surrounding areas
contact Hull Street Law at 804-230-4200

Disclaimer

The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice.  You should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney.  Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

Contact the Firm!

Hull Street Law
1010 Hull Street
Richmond, Virginia 23224
804-230-4200
804-230-4100 fax

Can a police officer order everyone out of the vehicle during a traffic stop?

Q. Can a police officer order everyone out of the vehicle during a traffic stop?
A. Yes.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, this rule is enforced by requiring police officers to obtain warrants in order to search or seize people. However, the Supreme Court of the United States has added many exceptions to the warrant requirement. Additionally, it has expanded the bounds of “reasonableness” in several areas where it has decided that a person’s right to privacy must be balanced with the fact that police officers have an inherently unsafe occupation.

In the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968) the Court carved out an exception to the warrant requirement which allows officers to briefly detain people for investigative purposes when there is an reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  These stops are known as “Terry Stops.”   During these stops, if the officer has some reasonable articulable suspicion that the person may be armed and dangerous, the officer may perform a brief, over-the-clothes pat down of the person. This pat down is known as a “frisk.”

In Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 784 (2009), the court stated that once a law enforcement officer has conducted a valid traffic stop, the officer is justified in conducting a frisk of the person for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.  Id.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 281 Va. 582, 589 (2011).

[I]n a traffic-stop setting, the first Terry condition — a lawful investigatory stop–is met whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, just as in the case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal activity, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.

Id.

In  Arizona v. Johnson,  the Court summarized the expanded rule from Terry as it applies to traffic stops:

Three decisions cumulatively portray Terry’s application in a traffic-stop setting: Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); and Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).

In Mimms, the Court held that “once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.” 434 U.S., at 111, n. 6.

Wilson held that the Mimms rule applied to passengers as well as to drivers. Specifically, the Court instructed that “an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.” 519 U.S. at 415.

It is true, the Court acknowledged, that in a lawful traffic stop, “[t]here is probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a minor vehicular offense,” but “there is no such reason to stop or detain the passengers.” Id. On the other hand, the Court emphasized, the risk of a violent encounter in a traffic-stop setting “stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.” Id., at 414. “[T]he motivation of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime,” the Court stated, “is every bit as great as that of the driver.” Ibid. Moreover, the Court noted, “as a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle,” id., at 413-414, so “the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal,” id., at 415.

Completing the picture, Brendlin held that a passenger is seized, just as the driver is, “from the moment [a car stopped by the police comes] to a halt on the side of the road.” 551 U.S., at 263. A passenger therefore has standing to challenge a stop’s constitutionality. Id., at 256-259.

After Wilson, but before Brendlin, the Court had stated, in dictum, that officers who conduct “routine traffic stop[s]” may “perform a ‘patdown’ of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-118 (1998). That forecast, we now confirm, accurately captures the combined thrust of the Court’s decisions in Mimms, Wilson, and Brendlin.

The answer is clear that an officer can order all occupants of a vehicle out of the car pending the completion of the stop if the initial stop was lawful. The reasoning behind these rules is almost always the same: officer safety. What is not so clear is what the officer can do then.

For example, officers are limited in their right to frisk the occupants of the vehicle. They are also limited in how much and what kind of investigations they can complete during the course of the stop. Finally, even if an officer can arrest an individual, there are limits on how much force the officer can use in the process of the arrest.

The rules governing the protection of citizens from unreasonable search and seizure are, at best, vague. If you are charged with a crime and feel that a police officer has violated your right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, call an experienced criminal defense attorney today.

For traffic or criminal defense in Virginia – Contact Hull Street Law!

Hull Street Law
a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-230-4200

 

La Muerte Injusta – Un resumen de la ley en Virginia

In English – Wrongful Death in Virginia

La Muerte Injusta – Un resumen de la ley en Virginia

Cuando un miembro de su familia se muere por causa del un hecho negligente o injusto el representativo personal del fallecido se puede hacer una demanda para daños y perjuicios dentro de los dos años del fallecimiento de la personal lesionada.  (Va. § 8.01-50, 8.01-244).

Las demandas de la muerte injusta no existen en la ley común, la legislación las autorizó. Por eso los estatutos controlan las demandas de la muerte injusta.

Los daños y perjuicios en una demanda de la muerte injusta – ¿Cuales son?

Los daños y perjuicios que se permite adjudicar el juez o el jurado son los daños y perjuicios  que el juez o jurado creen que estar “equitativo y justo.” (Va. § 8.01-52)

En un proceso sin jurado, los estatutos requieren que el veredicto incluye daños y perjuicios para lo siguiente:

(1)   La tristeza, angustia mental, y consuelo que incluyan el compañerismo, sociedad, comodidad, guía, y el consejo del  fallecido;

(2)   La compensación para el perdido razonable esperado de (i) los ingresos del fallecido y (ii) los servicios, protección, mantenimiento, y auxilio del fallecido;

(3)   Los gastos para el cuidado, tratamiento, y la hospitalización que resultaban por la lesión que causó la muerte.

(4)   Los gastos razonables para el funéreo.

(5)   Si el hecho que causó la muerte fue voluntarioso, sin sentido, o tan imprudente que evidencia una indiferencia consciente de la seguridad de otras, se pueden adjudicar daños y perjuicios punitivos.

¿Cuánto se pueden adjudicar cuanto para una muerte injusta?

Recientemente, La Corte Suprema de Virginia restableció una indemnización de $1,700,000.00 que  el juzgado de primera instancia había reducido.  En esta demanda, la evidencia mostraba que por causa de la muerta de su esposa, el marido sufría perdidos y dolores emocionales.   El marido describía preparándose la cena solo. Le decía al jurado que durante de sus treinta años del servicio militar, su esposa manejó los asuntos de negocios familiares y seguía que hacerlo después del marido se jubiló.  En sus propias palabras: “cuando se murió, yo estaba perdido.”     Al fin el marido describía visitando la tumba de su esposa. Los niños testificaron acerca de sus propias perdidas y hablaron acerca del parentesco que disfrutaban a través de los años con su madre y la influencia que ella tenía en su vida.

Shepard v. Capitol Foundry of Va., 262 Va. 715, 718-719 (Va. 2001)

¿Quién tiene el derecho para recuperar en una demanda de la muerte injusta?

Los estatutos dicen quien tiene el derecho para recuperar en una demanda de la muerte injusta, y los estatutos les llaman “Statutory Beneficiaries”.  Según a los estatutos, los Statutory Beneficiaries son:

  1. El/la esposo(a) sobreviviente, los niños del fallecido, y cualquier niños de un niño      muerto del fallecido.
  2. Si no existen las personas mencionadas en la primera lista, los padres del fallecido, los hermanos o las hermanas del fallecido, y también cualquier otro consanguíneo si el consanguíneo depende en el fallecido por mantenimiento y vivía en la misma casa del  fallecido.
  3. Si el fallecido tiene un(a) esposo(a) sobreviviente y padre(s) pero el fallecido falta    niños y/o nietos, se distribuirá la indemnización al esposo(a) sobreviviente  y los padres.
  4. Si existen personas mencionadas en (1) o (3) arriba, se distribuirá la indemnización a  el/la esposo(a) sobreviviente, los niños del fallecido, y cualquier niños de un niño muerto  del fallecido, y cualquier otros consanguíneos que dependen en el fallecido por   mantenimiento y que vivía en la misma del fallecido.
  5. Si no hay ningún sobreviviente mencionado en (1), (2), (3), o (4) se distribuirá la indemnización a según § 64.2-200 del Código de Virginia.

Según a los estatutos hay ciertas personas que no pueden calificar como un Statutory Beneficiary.  Estas personas son:

  1. Los padres, si un corte les ha terminado los derechos y responsabilidades   parentales.
  2. Los padres, si le han firmado un contrato con una agencia de bienestar infantil para dejar  los niños en la cuida del estado  permanentemente; un Permanent Entrustment Agreement.

Según a los estatutos, el término consanguíneo incluye familia relatada por una boda, la adopción, y los hijastros.   Los estatutos requieren que se identifiquen a los familiares que pueden recibir la indemnización (i) cuando el jurado entrega el veredicto, o (ii) cuando el juez enuncia el veredicto.  Además, una persona elegible bajo los estatutos se puede rechazar la indemnización.  En este caso, se distribuirá la indemnización a las otras personas que estén elegibles.

 ¿Qué debe hacer si un miembro de mi familia fue matado por un hecho negligente o injusto de otra persona?

Necesita un abogado experimentado.  Debe ponerse en contacto con el bufete de abogados de Hull Street Law, una División de Thomas H. Roberts & Associates de rápido.  Llámese: 804-783-2000.  ¡Póngase en contacto hoy!

Jonathan M. Arthur, Esq.
Hull Street Law
A Division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
1010 Hull Street
Richmond, VA 23224
(804) 230-4200 ext. 107
(804) 203-4100 fax

 

Descargo de Responsabilidad

Estas materiales están para los fines de información.  Se las crean por este propósito únicamente.  Estas materiales no están consejos legales. Sin haber hablado con un abogado pidiéndole consejo, no se debe usar esta información para cualquier hecho o acto.  No hay nada aquí que crea relación de abogado-cliente

El uso de la fuerza excesiva en una Pesquisa Terry resulta en responsabilidad legal contra un oficial de policía.

English Translation

El uso de la fuerza excesiva en una Pesquisa Terry resulta en responsabilidad legal contra un oficial de policía. 

El uso de la fuerza excesiva a llevar a cabo un registro.

En el 30 del Enero, 2013 un jurado en Richmond adjudicó $250,000 a Wesley Moore, un oficial de policía de Richmond, contra otra oficial de policía por causa de un agresión que ocurrió durante de una  parada y registro en el 10 de Augusto, 2010 en el lado sur de Richmond.  El Sr. Thomas Roberts, Esq. y el Sr. Andrew Bodoh, Esq. abogados de derechos civiles en la bufete Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC, representaban al Sr. Moore.  Durante de la parada el Sr. Moore le pidió al otro oficial explicarle la razón que el oficial tenía para detenerle.  El Sr. Moore retó cada aclaración que ofrecía el otro oficial.   El Sr. Moore no se identificaba como un oficial en el estatus de licencia administrativa pagada el cual estaba relacionado a una descarga justificada de su rifle de francotirador durante de una operación de SWAT.  El otro oficial no conocía el estatus del oficial Moore.

Los hechos y la ley.

Lo que pasaba es lo siguiente.  El otro oficial le ordenaba al Sr. Moore a salir del coche.  El Sr. Moore declaraba que el oficial le dio un empujón contra el lado de su furgoneta con mucha fuerza e después el oficial le saltaba sobre su espalda.  Por causa del peso del oficial, el Sr. Moore se agachó y en combinación con el ímpetu del oficial, el Sr. Moore se cayó.  El tribunal la rechazó la contención que el Sr. Moore le ofrecía, que el otro oficial  la faltaba justificación legal y la parada y pesquisa fueran arbitrarias.  A pesar de esta, el Sr. Moore razonaba que aun bajo una “Pesquisa Terry” (Terry Stop), una pesquisa autorizaba por Terry v. Ohio, la policía la faltaban la autorización usar fuerza excesiva contra él o saltar sobre su espalda. En el caso del Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), La Corte Suprema de Los Estados Unidos dictaminó que no infringe la prohibición de las pesquisas y aprehensiones arbitrarias que se encuentra en La Cuarta Enmienda a la Constitución de Los Estados Unidos cuando una policía la ordena una persona a parar para llevar a cabo un registro aun cuando la policía la faltaba la causa probable a detener la persona, si la policía tiene una sospecha razonable, especifica, y articulada, que la persona ha cometido, está cometiendo o está a punto cometer un delito y tiene una creencia razonable que la persona este, en tal momento, armada y peligrosa.

La adjudicación.

Por un fallo del equipo,  el vídeo de la cámara en el panel de instrumentos del coche del oficial no estaba disponible.  El Sr. Moore testificaba que el incidente le molestaba mucho y después del incidente él estaba avergonzado, sufría dolores del pecho, y que no pasada ningún día sin pensar en el agresión.  El Oficial Moore, un oficial de la policía de la cuidad de Richmond es un miembro de SWAT y también es un oficial de K-9 y un instructor de la academia de policía.  El jurado le adjudicó $250,000 al Sr. Moore y el Sr. Moore dijo que se ha esperado mucho tiempo para que un jurado llevar la verdad a la gente.

¿Qué debo hacer si la policía use la fuerza excesivo contra mí?

Si la policía le pega o usa fuerza excesiva contra usted, necesitará un abogado experimentado para proteger sus derechos.  Debe ponerse en contacto con el bufete de abogados de Hull Street Law, una División de Thomas H. Roberts & Associates de rápido.  Llamase: 804-783-2000.

 

Jonathan M. Arthur, Esq.
Hull Street Law
A Division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 230-4200 ext. 107
(804) 203-4100 fax

 

 Descargo de Responsabilidad

Los hechos y las circunstancias de cada caso son singulares.  Por lo tanto el hecho que un bufete ha obtenido veredictos y resultados significativos en otros casos en ninguna manera garantiza que otros casos tendrán resultados similares.   Estas materiales están para los fines de información.  Se las crean para este propósito únicamente.  Estas materiales no están consejos legales. Sin haber hablado con un abogado pidiéndole consejo, no se debe usar esta información para cualquier hecho o acto.  No hay nada aquí que crea relación de abogado-cliente.

Los derechos de niños bajo la cuarta enmienda a la constitución de los estados unidos

English Translation

Los derechos de niños bajo la cuarta enmienda a la constitución de los estados unidos

El derecho consagrado de  La Cuarta Enmienda, el que dice  “el derecho de los habitantes de que sus personas, domicilios, papeles y efectos se hallen a salvo de pesquisas y aprehensiones arbitrarias, será inviolable” normalmente requiere  un oficial de la policía, antes de empezar un registro y/o una aprehensión, tener causa razonable.     La Corte Suprema de Los Estados Unidos nos explica cuando existe esta causa razonable: “Causa razonable existe cuando los hechos y circunstancias dentro de la conocimiento [del oficial de la policía] y del cual [el] tenía información ambas razonable y confiable, [están] suficientes por si mismos para justificar la creencia de un hombre de cuidado razonable que se hayan cometido o se están cometiendo un delito” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949) (citando  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925)), y se creen que las pruebas relacionadas al delito están encontrados en el sitio registrado.

En W v. California, 449 U.S. 1043,1047 (1980), un menor de edad pidió a La Corte Suprema a declarar que los padres faltan el poder de dispensar los derechos constitucionales de sus niños y que la Cuarta Enmienda se aplique de manera igual a niños como adultos.   La Corte se rechazo escuchar la petición del niño; pero en su disensión, Justicia Marshall razonaba que: “[p]orque la pérdida de libertad daña igualmente los niños como los adultos, In re Gault, 378 U.S. at 27, hemos dicho que los derechos de los menores de edad son casi coextendidos que los de adultos.   Por esto, hemos incluido los menores de edad en las protecciones en la Decimocuarto Enmienda contra la privación de libertad sin el debido proceso legal.    Hemos dicho que un menor de edad tiene el derecho a abogados, a confrontar a los testigos, y al aviso cuando el menor se enfrenta cargos penales.  Id. at 33, 36-37, 57.  ‘No se puede dejar que ni hombre ni menor de edad quedar condenada por métodos que no sigan los requisitos constitucionales del debido proceso legal.’ Id. at 13, citando con aprobación  Haley v. Ohio, 335 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) De manera igual, nuestros casos han dando a los menores de edad el derecho contra autoincriminación, In re Gault, supra, las protecciones contra confesiones forzadas, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962),  doble juzgamiento por la misma causa, Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), y la suposición de inocencia implicada por el peso de la prueba que tiene el gobierno  a probar culpabilidad fuera de toda duda razonable.  In re Winship, 3798 U.S. 358 (1970).”  W. v. California, 449 U.S. 1043, 1047 (1980).

En la escuela – el estándar de la sospecha razonable

Cuando un oficial de la escuela quiere registrar a un niño, La Corte Suprema ha dicho que “ a mantener equilibro cuidado entre los intereses gubernamentales  y privados implica que el interés público es mejor protegido por un estándar de lo razonable que pare justo antes de causa razonable, “Stafford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 370 (2009), citando Jersey v. T.L.O., 49 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).  Las Cortes aplicarán  un estándar de  “sospecha razonable” (no lo de causa razonable, hay una diferencia),  a determinar si un registro de un estudiante por un oficial de la escuela queda dentro de la lay.  Si los métodos del registro son relacionadas razonables a los objetivos  del registro y no están extremadamente entrometidos cuando se piensa en la edad y el sexo del niño y el tipo de error que se crea que el estudiante haya cometido, la Corte se le permitirá el registro.  Id.  at 342.

El estándar de sospecha razonable no es tan difícil que el estándar de causa razonable y se puede traducir tal estándar como “una mediana chance de encontrar pruebas de un error o delito.”  El estándar de causa probable requiere que la policía tiene el conocimiento de una chance, decente o grande, de encontrar pruebas de un error o delito,  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 238 (1983), Stafford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (La Corte declaró que un registro de un estudiante a buscar ibuprofeno en se le exige el estudiante desnudarse no queda dentro de la ley tampoco la constitución.)

El consentimiento del menor de edad. 

Un menor de edad puede, bajo ciertas condiciones, consentir a un registro a una casa (incluyendo la de sus padres), una automóvil, o/y su propia persona.   La Cuarta Enmienda permite un registro sin orden judicial de una casa cuando una persona que tenga la autoridad sobre la casa le da su consentimiento a la policía a registrar la casa.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (citando Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).  Un registro sin orden judicial no se rompe la cuarta enmienda cuando una persona a quien tenga la autoridad común sobre el sitio se le da su consentimiento. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974)).  Se obtienen “autoridad común” por “el  uso mutual del sitio por personas a quienes por lo general y por la mayoría de los objetivos  tienen acceso o control juntos.” Id. at 171 n. 7.  Normalmente, toda la familia tiene control común sobre todas las cuartos de la casa.   United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 777 (6th Cir. 1990).  A pesar de esta, se puede quitar la autoridad común de un miembro de la familia si otro miembro “haya manifestado de manera clara una clara expectativa de exclusividad.” Id. at 778. 

“Tal persona pueda estar …otro ocupante de la casa a quien tiene la autoridad común sobre la casa, cuando no está  presente la persona, y esta excepción por consentimiento incluye  los registros y entradas obtenido por el permiso de un ocupante a quien la policía crea, por manera razonable pero erróneamente, tiene  la autoridad común como ocupante de la casa.   Georgia v. Randolph, 547 US at 108, (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186;United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)).

Se lo determina caso por caso la pregunta  de cuándo un menor de edad tiene la capaz de consentir a un registro a una casa, un automóvil, y/o su propia persona. La Corte prestará atención a los factores siguientes: (1) El nivel de sofisticación legal del niño (no se requieren sofisticación legal para los adultos), (2) factores que sugieren que el consentimiento fuera voluntario (lo más joven, lo más susceptible a coacción), (3) el equilibrio entre el daño que una limitación de la habilidad de un niño a consentir tendrá, y el propósito legitimo que  las registraciones dando con consentimiento sirven, (4) La idea de agencia no está incluida en las razones que apoyan la idea del consentimiento por común autoridad, y la compromiso de la expectativa de privacidad es tan fuerte para los ocupantes de menor de edad como los adultos.”  United States v. Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d 1225, 1230-1231 (10th Cir. N.M. 1998).

La labilidad civil si la corte determina que una registra o pesquisa rompe la cuarta enmienda.

No será suficiente  a obtener daños y perjuicios a mostrar que la conducta rompe a la Cuarta Enmienda.  Normalmente, el acusado asegura que tiene la inmunidad soberana.   “Los oficiales gubernamentales normalmente no tienen labilidad por funciones discrecionales si la conducta no rompa claramente los derechos establecidos por  estatutos o la constitución que un hombre razonable conocería.”Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982).  Se usan un proceso de dos pasos a determinar si está disponible la inmunidad soberana.  Primero, el acusado tiene que mostrar que su conducta queda dentro del ámbito de su autoridad discrecional.  Si el acusado tiene éxito a mostrar tales cosas, en el próximo paso el demandante tendrá mostrar que el acusado violaba sus derechos establecidos por  estatutos o la constitución.  Los hechos de un oficial gubernamental quedan dentro del ámbito de su autoridad discrecional si los hechos fueran (1) hecho en consecuencia del desempeño de su debidos, y (2) dentro del ámbito de su autoridad.  En los casos en que el oficial gubernamental no actuara en acuerdo con su autoridad discrecional, no se aplicará la inmunidad soberana.  Si el oficial falta la inmunidad soberana, es posible que se obtenga daños y perjuicios.

¿Qué debo hacer si la policía violaba mis derechos constitucionales?

Si la policía violaba sus derechos constitucionales, necesitará un abogado experimentado para proteger sus derechos.  Debe ponerse en contacto con el bufete de abogados de Hull Street Law, una División de Thomas H. Roberts & Associates de rápido.  Llamase: 804-783-2000.

 

Jonathan M. Arthur, Esq.
Hull Street Law
A Division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
1010 Hull Street
Richmond, VA 23224
(804) 230-4200 ext. 107
(804) 203-4100 fax

 

 Descargo de Responsabilidad

Los hechos y las circunstancias de cada caso son singulares.  Por lo tanto el hecho que un bufete ha obtenido veredictos y resultados significativos en otros casos en ninguna manera garantiza que otros casos tendrán resultados similares.   Estas materiales están para los fines de información.  Se las crean para este propósito únicamente.  Estas materiales no están consejos legales. Sin haber hablado con un abogado pidiéndole consejo, no se debe usar esta información para cualquier hecho o acto.  No hay nada aquí que crea relación de abogado-cliente.

 

Can I protect my assets from creditors and retain the right to benefit from them during my life?

Generally, assets in a “spendthrift” trust are protected from the creditors of the beneficiaries of the trust and cannot be alienated (given away or sold) by the beneficiaries. The creation of spendthrift trusts has been made simpler for beneficiaries other than the creator of the trust (called the settlor) under Virginia Code § 64.2-743. If a settlor wished to create a spendthrift trust for his child, he need only to declare it a “spendthrift trust” in the trust instrument.

However, historically, Virginia has not looked favorably upon self-settled spendthrift trusts. Self-settled trusts are those in which the settlor retains the right to income. In fact, the Code of Virginia specifically made a host of transfers to self-settled trusts subject to claw back provisions which allow the settlor’s creditors access to the assets of a self-settled trust. Va. Code § 64.2-747.

A new provision that became effective at the same time as the recent re-alignment of the estates and trusts provisions code significantly changes the landscape of private asset protection trusts. Under Virginia Code § 64.2-745.1, Virginia is now allowing the creation of self-settled spendthrift trusts. A self-settled spendthrift trust is one in which the settlor irrevocably grants ownership of assets to his trust and he retains some ability to receive income from the trust. Furthermore, the trust would, after some time, be protected from his creditors.

While these new vehicles for asset protection open up opportunities for individuals in the Commonwealth to protect their assets, the security comes with significant caveats which will require careful consideration and drafting. It is important that you obtain the assistance of a qualified attorney to help you avoid potential pitfalls – up to and including the disregard of Virginia Code § 64.2-745.1 altogether.

For a consultation and detailed review of your estate plan, including whether a self-settled spendthrift trust is appropriate for you, contact the law firm.
Hull Street Law
1010 Hull Street
Richmond, VA 23224
804-230-4200
804-230-4100 fax

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Disclaimer

The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice and you should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney.  Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.