In Virginia, you can represent yourself in court. (You cannot represent your limited liability company or corporation except for limited exceptions in General District Court; You cannot represent your children, your spouse or others)
It is often not wise to represent yourself – but you still have that right.
In criminal cases, you have a 5th Amendment right to remain silent, which is hard to do when you are representing yourself!!!
However, if you decide to represent yourself, you may find some helpful tips here.
Civil Rights In Virginia – Upheld By Virginia’s Highest Court – 2020
Virginia’s Highest Court Confirm’s That It Will Not Tolerate Virginia Law Enforcement Violations Of The 4th Amendment To The U.S. Constitution Or Virginia Statutes Protecting Its Citizens from Unlawful Arrests, Unlawful Searches and Excessive Force.
On January 16, 2020, the Virginia Supreme Court issued an opinion reversing the Circuit Court for the City of Petersburg which rejected federal civil rights claims and a unlawful search claim of Monica Cromartie, finding that Petersburg Police Officer Brian Lee Billings is liable for violations of an unlawful search under Virginia Code § 19.2-59, for false arrest under 42 USC § 1983 and excessive force claims under 42 USC § 1983 and remanding the case for a determination of compensatory and punitive damages, an award of costs, interest, and attorneys’ fees.
In this case, Monica Cromartie, an African American woman was stopped for speeding. A simple matter involving a traffic infraction went terribly wrong. When Ms. Cromartie got out of the car protesting, Officer Brian Lee Billings directed her to get back in her car and shut the door, which she did. Ms. Cromartie was a 54 year-old woman weighing about 100 pounds and standing about 4’ 9 inches. After backup arrived, Officer Billings approached the vehicle while Ms. Cromartie was vigorously protesting to somebody else on her cellphone, when he knocked on her window. She replied “What” but continued her protest into her cell-phone. When Billings stated “I need you to roll down your window” and “Ma’am” knocking on the window a second time, she stated “Hey officer, leave me alone.” With a mere seconds passing, Officer Billings overreacted in a hostile and violent fashion, opened the driver’s door and ripped Ms. Cromartie from the car and forced her face-down onto the payment and placed his weight on her back with such force that he injured Ms. Cromartie’s forehead, teeth, lip, right eye and right knee before she was handcuffed and then shackled by the legs by other officers. Officer Billings testified under oath to the magistrate that he “opened the car door, instructed her to get out” which the police videos did not support in order to obtain a warrant for obstruction of justice against her which was later dismissed. The court found the fact that a neutral magistrate issued a warrant was not in this case a clear indication that an officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner, stating “when ‘it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue,’ the “shield of immunity” otherwise conferred by the warrant will be lost.’”
Jonathan Arthur and Andrew Bodoh, attorneys with the civil rights law firm of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC represented her in a civil jury trial in Petersburg where the jury determined that Officer Billings had in fact assaulted and battered, falsely imprisoned and maliciously prosecuted Ms. Cromartie on charges of obstruction of justice. However, the trial court ruled that the jury did not get to decide the state law claim of the unlawful search or the federal law claims of the 4th Amendment violations because it ruled that Officer Billings was legally immune from such claims. The law firm appealed the denial of the Circuit Court to submit to the jury the claims for an unlawful search that followed the unlawful arrest, together with the constitutional claims. Attorney Jonathan Arthur argued the case to the Virginia Supreme Court.
Andrew Bodoh, Esq.
On April 20, 1871 congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” as a remedy to protect citizens who were denied federal and U.S. Constitutional rights. Later, 42 USC § 1983 incorporated the act to provide a remedy for violations. In 1976, congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, which became 42 U.S.C. § 1988, explicitly providing for attorneys’ fees to continue to enable law firm’s like Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC to be reimbursed for the high costs of championing the civil rights of people like Ms. Cromartie. Congress was motivated by the fear that civil rights statutes would not be enforced, civil liberties would not be protected, and officers like Billings would remain unaccountable for their actions without private plaintiffs like Cromartie and that the high costs of civil rights litigation would discourage plaintiffs like Cromartie from bringing civil rights suits. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., note 9, at 1; 6 (1976).
The law firm of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC. has been litigating civil rights and personal injury cases since 1986. The first firm to obtain a verdict of $1 Million + in the history of Henrico County, the law firm has obtained many significant victories to protect the injured, individual liberties and to protect the civil rights of Virginia’s citizens.
Hull Street law handles high profile criminal cases in Central Virginia.
February 7, 2018 – Civil rights attorneys Tom Roberts successfully defended former Dinwiddie County Deputy Hector Jimenez in a high profile criminal case. Mr. Jimenez had been charged with two felonies: taking indecent liberties with a minor in violation of VA Code § 18.2-370(A)(4), with potential imprisonment of between 1 and 10 years, and aggravated sexual battery in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-67.3(A)(4)(a), with potential imprisonment of between 1 and 20 years. On February 7, 2018, the state dropped the charges against Mr. Jimenez.
The prosecutor explained to the court on Wednesday that Mr. Jimenez had hired two very competent and aggressive attorneys that she expected would thoroughly cross-examine the complaining juvenile witness and her father. The prosecutor stated that the juvenile’s father was involved in a contentious custody battle and had a criminal and mental health history.
The juvenile’s mother was less than 5 feet from Mr. Jimenez and her daughter at the time of the alleged incident. Three other people were also in the room at the time of the alleged incident. All were prepared to testify that the allegations were false. The juvenile’s mother had consistently denied that the incidents took place or that her daughter had ever reported the incidents to her until after the juvenile moved out of the mother’s home.
The juvenile was never alone with Mr. Jimenez. The allegations were made over 1 ½ years after the alleged incident at a time when a contentious custody battle between the juvenile’s parents was on the horizon. The girl’s mother had dated Mr. Jimenez for only about 5 weeks.
Mr. Jimenez had numerous reputation witnesses, ready to tell the jury of his strong reputation, and his squeaky clean service both in the military and in law enforcement.
The firm stated, “Our client maintained his innocence throughout and was prepared to defend his reputation and to present credible witnesses at trial who would have testified that they were present and the incidents as alleged did not occur.” Attorney Roberts stated, “It is important to remember that the law holds all defendants innocent until proven otherwise by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We are committed to holding the government to this high standard that separates us from uncivilized and totalitarian societies. This is the reason that we have earned a reputation for being competent and aggressive.”
Hull Street Law encourages mediation, a voluntary process by which the parties to a dispute with the help of a skilled mediator crafts their own resolution instead of relying upon a judge or jury who rarely have or understand all of the facts to do so. Hull Street Law recommends Axiom Mediation Group in Central Virginia when you need mediation!
The facts and circumstances of each case are unique and therefore the fact that a law firm has obtained significant verdicts and results in other cases in no way guarantees that other cases will have similar results.
I’ve been charged with “possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Virginia,” I need a good criminal defense attorney who handles possession of a firearm cases by a convicted felon.
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Using Old Chief to exclude the name and nature of a substantially similar offenses in a Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon case.
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Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Va Code § 18.2-308.2 is one of the most devastating class 6 felonies an individual can be charged with in Virginia. Not just because a second amendment right has been taken away from the person, but because you can face mandatory minimum time. If you are charged with this crime and your prior felony occurred in the last 10 years, you must serve a minimum of two years if convicted. If you were convicted of a violent felony as defined in Va Code § 17.1-805 at any time prior to being charged with this offense and you are subsequently convicted, then you will automatically receive the maximum punishment for a class 6 felony…5 years!
The Commonwealth has the burden to prove (1) that the defendant was convicted of a felony under any state or federal law and (2) that the defendant was in possession of a firearm or stun weapon as defined in 18.2-308.1 or explosive materials. The first element of a felony conviction is typically a foregone conclusion and the Commonwealth can prove this introducing the indictment of the charge including what the charge was and when and where it occurred.
Under Va. Rule of Evidence 2:403 the court has the discretion to exclude evidence that would be substantially more prejudicial than probative. While evidence is rarely excluded on this basis, particularly when introducing evidence of a required element of the offense, in the case of a possession of a firearm by convicted felon, a prior felony offense of a similar nature could certainly impact the jury in an unfairly prejudicial way. ESPECIALLY, IF THE PRIOR CONVICTION WAS A POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A CONVICTED FELON!
In Old Chief v. United States, the United Sates Supreme Court was asked to address whether the particulars of a conviction are admissible in a firearm felon case, given an offer by the defense to stipulate to the fact that the defendant is a convicted felon. The Court found that, given an offer to stipulate, the probative value of the particulars of the conviction was discounted and substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The risk of unfair prejudice can vary from case to case but… “[w]here a prior conviction was for a gun crime or one similar to other charges in a pending case the risk of unfair prejudice would be especially obvious…” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997).
I had a recent case where it appeared that this issue had not been directly addressed in Virginia with respect to an offer to stipulate (see Boone v. Commonwealth 285 Va. 597 (2013)), and all negative case law preceded Old Chief (see Glover v. Commonwealth 285 Va. 597 (1986); see also Essex v. Commonwealth (18 Va. App. 168 (1994)). After consulting with colleagues at the Richmond Public Defender’s office, I filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to the specifics of the prior conviction (which in my case was a federal firearm felon conviction). After review of the case law and brief oral argument, the court in my case found that Old Chief was very much on point and extremely persuasive and thus granted the motion and advised us to agree on an appropriate stipulation with the Commonwealth.
While it may initially seem unwise to concede an element of the crime, as I stated earlier, the fact that the defendant was a convicted felon was a foregone conclusion that would be easily proven by the Commonwealth. The exclusion of the specifics of his prior felony meant that the jury could not see that the defendant was previously convicted of a similar crime in federal court ten years earlier. There is no doubt that this information would have been extremely prejudicial to the client. Once we were able to keep the specifics of his conviction out of evidence and focus simply on whether he was in possession of a firearm on that specific day, the case leaned more in our favor because the jury could not be distracted by the fact that he’d been convicted of the same offense in federal court.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence and after closing statements, within 30 minutes the jury returned a not guilty verdict and freed my client from the burden of a 5 year mandatory sentence. There is no doubt in my mind that had the jury learned that he had been convicted of a federal firearm charge previously, this would have been a much more difficult case.
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If you have been charged with a crime or you are appealing your conviction, you should contact us immediately.
Hull Street Law
a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 230-4200
Disclaimer
The materials are prepared for information purposes only. The materials are not legal advice and you should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney. Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.
The odor of weed/marijuana wafting from a home gives police the warrantless-keys to a home.
This area of the law will continue to change – eventually with legalization of marijuana, officers will not be able to use the smell of marijuana as a basis for a search without a warrant. But until then…
In 2011, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the police should not be able to create exigent circumstances by knocking on the door or making their presence known in order to avoid the general requirement that they obtain a search warrant before entering a home. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859-62 (2011)(rejecting “police-created” exigency doctrine). If police have probable cause and a reasonable belief that evidence is being destroyed they are permitted to enter a home without a warrant and conduct a search, even though they have created the exigent circumstances.
There is no fixed legal definition that fully captures the meaning of exigent circumstances. Courts consider the commonalities for cases providing exigent circumstances mixed with practical commonsense judgment when determining whether officers in a myriad of situations with varied fact patterns face exigent circumstances excusing a warrant before conducting a search.
While there is a rebuttable presumption that a warrant is required by the Fourth Amendment prior to a search, in King, the court explained “[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.'” Id. 131 S. Ct. at 1856. The Fourth Amendment’s text condemns only ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures, and does not expressly require warrants. The rebuttable presumption can be overcome by judicially recognized reasonable exceptions.
The inquiry focuses on what an objective officer could reasonably believe. Courts have found exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry and search where the smell of marijuana wafting from a residence with the announced or obvious presence of the police would cause an officer to reasonably believe that a crime is underfoot and that the evidence (marijuana) would be destroyed if entry and search is not promptly made.
Each case is judged based upon its own unique facts. In Evans v. Commonwealth, 776 S.E.2d 760, 766, (2015), the Virginia Supreme Court found officers justified entering a home where the smell of marijuana wafted from the home and the occupant interacted three times with the police in circumstances that increased the probable cause and exigency. When the defendant’s mother opened the door, a cloud of heavy and extremely strong marijuana odors, some of which blew “like a gust of wind,” past police officers through the open doorway; then when the mother opened the door again in response to more knocking she suspiciously volunteered denial (“Ain’t nobody smoking weed in here”) and appeared nervous and shaking in the face of the obvious fact that police officers smelled marijuana odors blowing through the doorway and finally that she slammed the door in the face of police officers in response to their further inquiries with sounds of unspecified movement inside the apartment after the door was slammed shut and finally did not respond to the additional knocks on the door by the investigating officers.
Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC provides criminal defense in Central Virginia. The law firm specializes in creative litigation and civil rights. The law firm frequently litigates issues related to the Fourth Amendment in criminal and civil courts.
Contact the law firm immediately if you have been charged with a crime and there is an issue related to whether or not the Fourth Amendment was violated.
You need experienced counsel. You should contact a lawyer with Hull Street Law today.
Call
HULL STREET LAW
at 804-230-4200
to set up your initial consultation today.
Hull Street Law
a division of
Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-230-4200
804-230-4100 fax
Disclaimer
The materials are prepared for information purposes only. The materials are not legal advice. You should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney. Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.
What is the difference between construction fraud and breach of contract under Va. Code 18.2-200.1?
The Commonwealth must prove 5 things to convict a person of construction fraud, namely that the contractor (1) obtained an advance of money from another person; (2) had a fraudulent intent at the time the advance is obtained; (3) made a promise to perform construction or improvement involving real property; (4) failed to perform the promise; and (5) failed to return the advance within fifteen days of a request to do so by certified mail to the defendant’s last known address or his address listed in the contract.
The fraudulent intent must exist at the time that the contractor procured the advance. The contractor must fail or refuse to “perform” the promised work and to “substantially make good such advance.” The Commonwealth must present additional proof that the contractor “fail[ed] to return such advance within fifteen days of a request to do so.”
Now on a technical but essential note, the request for the return of the advance may not include something different than an unqualified demand to return all or part of the original advance. The Virginia Supreme Court explained the reason for such a strict reading of the statute, stating,
The construction fraud statute, Code § 18.2-200.1, was not meant simply to criminalize a contractor’s breach of contract. The statute instead criminalizes a species of fraud analogous to the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses….
The statute does not say that the notice can give the contractor other options — such as continued contractual performance at a reduced price, the return of something other than the advance, or the delivery of materials in lieu of a return of the advance. There are sound reasons for not overcomplicating the statute in such manner. If the contractor “fails to return such advance,” he “shall be deemed guilty of the larceny of such money” if the other requirements of the statute are also met. Id. The contractor, therefore, should not be misled into believing that anything other than a return of the advance would relieve him of the very real risk of criminal prosecution.
Bowman v. Commonwealth, 777 S.E.2d 851, 855-856 (2015)
The law firm of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC represents clients in matters involving construction disputes and litigation. Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC represents defendants charged with construction fraud.
You need experienced counsel. You should contact a lawyer with Hull Street Law today.
Call 804-230-4200
Hull Street Law
a division of
Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-230-4200
Disclaimer
The materials are prepared for information purposes only. The materials are not legal advice. You should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney. Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.
IS VIOLATION OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER A CRIME IN VIRGINIA?
ANSWER: YES!
Pursuant to § 18.2-60.4 of the Code of Virginia, any person who violates any provision of a protective order issued pursuant to § 19.2-152.8, 19.2-152.9 or 19.2-152.10 is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. The penalty is up to one year in jail and/or $2,500 fine. For repeat offenders the penalties increase and may include a Class 6 felony conviction with mandatory confinement. Additionally, if the person commits an assault and battery upon the person protected by the protective order resulting in serious bodily injury, the person is guilty of a Class 6 felony. Similarly entering the home of a person protected or remaining in the home for the protective person bumps the crime to a Class 6 felony. Finally, any conviction will result in a mandatory protective order under § 19.2-152.1. (So even if the initial protective order would have been dismissed, violation and conviction for violating that order will definitely result in a protective order being entered for a specific period not exceeding two years.) Anytime a person is facing the imposition of a protective order or a charge for violation of a protective order counsel should engage counsel for any such matter in Richmond, Chesterfield, Henrico, Hanover, Goochland, Colonial Heights, Hopewell or Petersburg.
Can the judge order restitution be paid to the insurance company for medical expenses incurred by the victim of a crime?
Generally, the answer is “NO”. In Virginia, the public policy as set out by the legislature in § 38.2-3405 states that it is unlawful for an insurance contract providing hospital, medical, surgical and similar or related benefits to contain any provision providing for subrogation of any person’s right to recovery for personal injuries from a third person. Generally, there is no subrogation for medical expenses in personal injury in Virginia.
Exceptions to this general rule, include all state and federal benefits plans (Medicaid, Medicare, VCUHS, and other State Hospitals, etc.), worker’s compensation and ERISA plans for companies that are fully self-insured.
If you have been charged with a crime or you are appealing your conviction, you should contact us immediately.
Hull Street Law
a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 230-4200
(804) 230-4100 fax
Disclaimer
The materials are prepared for information purposes only. The materials are not legal advice and you should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney. Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.
