Hull Street Law successful in defense of high profile Dinwiddie County case against former deputy!

Hull Street law handles high profile criminal cases in Central Virginia.

February 7, 2018 – Civil rights attorneys Tom Roberts successfully defended former Dinwiddie County Deputy Hector Jimenez in a high profile criminal case. Mr. Jimenez had been charged with two felonies: taking indecent liberties with a minor in violation of VA Code § 18.2-370(A)(4), with potential imprisonment of between 1 and 10 years, and aggravated sexual battery in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-67.3(A)(4)(a), with potential imprisonment of between 1 and 20 years. On February 7, 2018, the state dropped the charges against Mr. Jimenez.

The prosecutor explained to the court on Wednesday that Mr. Jimenez had hired two very competent and aggressive attorneys that she expected would thoroughly cross-examine the complaining juvenile witness and her father. The prosecutor stated that the juvenile’s father was involved in a contentious custody battle and had a criminal and mental health history.

The juvenile’s mother was less than 5 feet from Mr. Jimenez and her daughter at the time of the alleged incident. Three other people were also in the room at the time of the alleged incident. All were prepared to testify that the allegations were false. The juvenile’s mother had consistently denied that the incidents took place or that her daughter had ever reported the incidents to her until after the juvenile moved out of the mother’s home.

The juvenile was never alone with Mr. Jimenez. The allegations were made over 1 ½ years after the alleged incident at a time when a contentious custody battle between the juvenile’s parents was on the horizon. The girl’s mother had dated Mr. Jimenez for only about 5 weeks.

Mr. Jimenez had numerous reputation witnesses, ready to tell the jury of his strong reputation, and his squeaky clean service both in the military and in law enforcement.

The firm stated, “Our client maintained his innocence throughout and was prepared to defend his reputation and to present credible witnesses at trial who would have testified that they were present and the incidents as alleged did not occur.” Attorney Roberts stated, “It is important to remember that the law holds all defendants innocent until proven otherwise by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We are committed to holding the government to this high standard that separates us from uncivilized and totalitarian societies. This is the reason that we have earned a reputation for being competent and aggressive.”

Attorney Tom Roberts, Esq.

Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC

105 S 1st Street

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 783-2000 x 105

www.robertslaw.org

www.hullstreetlaw.com

July 27, 2016February 4, 2023

Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Virginia – Legal Defense

The facts and circumstances of each case are unique and therefore the fact that a law firm has obtained significant verdicts and results in other cases in no way guarantees that other cases will have similar results.

I’ve been charged with “possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Virginia,” I need a good criminal defense attorney who handles possession of a firearm cases by a convicted felon.

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**Using Old Chief to exclude the name and nature of a substantially similar offenses in a Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon case.**

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Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Va Code § 18.2-308.2 is one of the most devastating class 6 felonies an individual can be charged with in Virginia. Not just because a second amendment right has been taken away from the person, but because you can face mandatory minimum time. If you are charged with this crime and your prior felony occurred in the last 10 years, you must serve a minimum of two years if convicted. If you were convicted of a violent felony as defined in Va Code § 17.1-805 at any time prior to being charged with this offense and you are subsequently convicted, then you will automatically receive the maximum punishment for a class 6 felony…5 years!

The Commonwealth has the burden to prove (1) that the defendant was convicted of a felony under any state or federal law and (2) that the defendant was in possession of a firearm or stun weapon as defined in 18.2-308.1 or explosive materials. The first element of a felony conviction is typically a foregone conclusion and the Commonwealth can prove this introducing the indictment of the charge including what the charge was and when and where it occurred.

Under Va. Rule of Evidence 2:403 the court has the discretion to exclude evidence that would be substantially more prejudicial than probative. While evidence is rarely excluded on this basis, particularly when introducing evidence of a required element of the offense, in the case of a possession of a firearm by convicted felon, a prior felony offense of a similar nature could certainly impact the jury in an unfairly prejudicial way. ESPECIALLY, IF THE PRIOR CONVICTION WAS A POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A CONVICTED FELON!

In Old Chief v. United States, the United Sates Supreme Court was asked to address whether the particulars of a conviction are admissible in a firearm felon case, given an offer by the defense to stipulate to the fact that the defendant is a convicted felon. The Court found that, given an offer to stipulate, the probative value of the particulars of the conviction was discounted and substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The risk of unfair prejudice can vary from case to case but… “[w]here a prior conviction was for a gun crime or one similar to other charges in a pending case the risk of unfair prejudice would be especially obvious…” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997).

I had a recent case where it appeared that this issue had not been directly addressed in Virginia with respect to an offer to stipulate (see Boone v. Commonwealth 285 Va. 597 (2013)), and all negative case law preceded Old Chief (see Glover v. Commonwealth 285 Va. 597 (1986); see also Essex v. Commonwealth (18 Va. App. 168 (1994)). After consulting with colleagues at the Richmond Public Defender’s office, I filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to the specifics of the prior conviction (which in my case was a federal firearm felon conviction). After review of the case law and brief oral argument, the court in my case found that Old Chief was very much on point and extremely persuasive and thus granted the motion and advised us to agree on an appropriate stipulation with the Commonwealth.

While it may initially seem unwise to concede an element of the crime, as I stated earlier, the fact that the defendant was a convicted felon was a foregone conclusion that would be easily proven by the Commonwealth. The exclusion of the specifics of his prior felony meant that the jury could not see that the defendant was previously convicted of a similar crime in federal court ten years earlier. There is no doubt that this information would have been extremely prejudicial to the client. Once we were able to keep the specifics of his conviction out of evidence and focus simply on whether he was in possession of a firearm on that specific day, the case leaned more in our favor because the jury could not be distracted by the fact that he’d been convicted of the same offense in federal court.

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence and after closing statements, within 30 minutes the jury returned a not guilty verdict and freed my client from the burden of a 5 year mandatory sentence. There is no doubt in my mind that had the jury learned that he had been convicted of a federal firearm charge previously, this would have been a much more difficult case.

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If you have been charged with a crime or you are appealing your conviction, you should contact us immediately.

Hull Street Law
a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 230-4200

Disclaimer

The materials are prepared for information purposes only. The materials are not legal advice and you should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney. Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

January 23, 2016August 16, 2019

Smell of Weed Often Gives Police Keys to Home

The odor of weed/marijuana wafting from a home gives police the warrantless-keys to a home.

This area of the law will continue to change – eventually with legalization of marijuana, officers will not be able to use the smell of marijuana as a basis for a search without a warrant. But until then…

In 2011, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the police should not be able to create exigent circumstances by knocking on the door or making their presence known in order to avoid the general requirement that they obtain a search warrant before entering a home. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859-62 (2011)(rejecting “police-created” exigency doctrine). If police have probable cause and a reasonable belief that evidence is being destroyed they are permitted to enter a home without a warrant and conduct a search, even though they have created the exigent circumstances.

There is no fixed legal definition that fully captures the meaning of exigent circumstances. Courts consider the commonalities for cases providing exigent circumstances mixed with practical commonsense judgment when determining whether officers in a myriad of situations with varied fact patterns face exigent circumstances excusing a warrant before conducting a search.

While there is a rebuttable presumption that a warrant is required by the Fourth Amendment prior to a search, in King, the court explained “[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.'” Id. 131 S. Ct. at 1856. The Fourth Amendment’s text condemns only ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures, and does not expressly require warrants. The rebuttable presumption can be overcome by judicially recognized reasonable exceptions.

The inquiry focuses on what an objective officer could reasonably believe. Courts have found exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry and search where the smell of marijuana wafting from a residence with the announced or obvious presence of the police would cause an officer to reasonably believe that a crime is underfoot and that the evidence (marijuana) would be destroyed if entry and search is not promptly made.

Each case is judged based upon its own unique facts. In Evans v. Commonwealth, 776 S.E.2d 760, 766, (2015), the Virginia Supreme Court found officers justified entering a home where the smell of marijuana wafted from the home and the occupant interacted three times with the police in circumstances that increased the probable cause and exigency. When the defendant’s mother opened the door, a cloud of heavy and extremely strong marijuana odors, some of which blew “like a gust of wind,” past police officers through the open doorway; then when the mother opened the door again in response to more knocking she suspiciously volunteered denial (“Ain’t nobody smoking weed in here”) and appeared nervous and shaking in the face of the obvious fact that police officers smelled marijuana odors blowing through the doorway and finally that she slammed the door in the face of police officers in response to their further inquiries with sounds of unspecified movement inside the apartment after the door was slammed shut and finally did not respond to the additional knocks on the door by the investigating officers.

Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC provides criminal defense in Central Virginia. The law firm specializes in creative litigation and civil rights. The law firm frequently litigates issues related to the Fourth Amendment in criminal and civil courts.

Contact the law firm immediately if you have been charged with a crime and there is an issue related to whether or not the Fourth Amendment was violated.

You need experienced counsel. You should contact a lawyer with Hull Street Law today.

Call

HULL STREET LAW
at
804-230-4200
to set up your initial consultation today.

Hull Street Law
a division of
Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-230-4200
804-230-4100 fax

Disclaimer

The materials are prepared for information purposes only. The materials are not legal advice. You should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney. Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

January 23, 2016February 4, 2023

Criminal Defense for Construction Fraud in Virginia

What is the difference between construction fraud and breach of contract under Va. Code 18.2-200.1?

The Commonwealth must prove 5 things to convict a person of construction fraud, namely that the contractor (1) obtained an advance of money from another person; (2) had a fraudulent intent at the time the advance is obtained; (3) made a promise to perform construction or improvement involving real property; (4) failed to perform the promise; and (5) failed to return the advance within fifteen days of a request to do so by certified mail to the defendant’s last known address or his address listed in the contract.

The fraudulent intent must exist at the time that the contractor procured the advance. The contractor must fail or refuse to “perform” the promised work and to “substantially make good such advance.” The Commonwealth must present additional proof that the contractor “fail[ed] to return such advance within fifteen days of a request to do so.”

Now on a technical but essential note, the request for the return of the advance may not include something different than an unqualified demand to return all or part of the original advance. The Virginia Supreme Court explained the reason for such a strict reading of the statute, stating,

The construction fraud statute, Code § 18.2-200.1, was not meant simply to criminalize a contractor’s breach of contract. The statute instead criminalizes a species of fraud analogous to the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses….

The statute does not say that the notice can give the contractor other options — such as continued contractual performance at a reduced price, the return of something other than the advance, or the delivery of materials in lieu of a return of the advance. There are sound reasons for not overcomplicating the statute in such manner. If the contractor “fails to return such advance,” he “shall be deemed guilty of the larceny of such money” if the other requirements of the statute are also met. Id. The contractor, therefore, should not be misled into believing that anything other than a return of the advance would relieve him of the very real risk of criminal prosecution.

Bowman v. Commonwealth, 777 S.E.2d 851, 855-856 (2015)

The law firm of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC represents clients in matters involving construction disputes and litigation. Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC represents defendants charged with construction fraud.

You need experienced counsel. You should contact a lawyer with Hull Street Law today.

Call 804-230-4200

Hull Street Law
a division of
Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-230-4200

Disclaimer

December 7, 2015January 3, 2019

IS VIOLATION OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER A CRIME IN VIRGINIA?

ANSWER: YES!

Pursuant to § 18.2-60.4 of the Code of Virginia, any person who violates any provision of a protective order issued pursuant to § 19.2-152.8, 19.2-152.9 or 19.2-152.10 is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. The penalty is up to one year in jail and/or $2,500 fine. For repeat offenders the penalties increase and may include a Class 6 felony conviction with mandatory confinement. Additionally, if the person commits an assault and battery upon the person protected by the protective order resulting in serious bodily injury, the person is guilty of a Class 6 felony. Similarly entering the home of a person protected or remaining in the home for the protective person bumps the crime to a Class 6 felony. Finally, any conviction will result in a mandatory protective order under § 19.2-152.1. (So even if the initial protective order would have been dismissed, violation and conviction for violating that order will definitely result in a protective order being entered for a specific period not exceeding two years.) Anytime a person is facing the imposition of a protective order or a charge for violation of a protective order counsel should engage counsel for any such matter in Richmond, Chesterfield, Henrico, Hanover, Goochland, Colonial Heights, Hopewell or Petersburg.

If you have been charged with a crime, contact the law firm immediately.

Hull Street Law
a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.

105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-230-4200
804-230-4100 fax

January 5, 2015January 3, 2019

Can the judge order restitution be paid to the insurance company for medical expenses incurred by the victim of a crime?

Generally, the answer is “NO”. In Virginia, the public policy as set out by the legislature in § 38.2-3405 states that it is unlawful for an insurance contract providing hospital, medical, surgical and similar or related benefits to contain any provision providing for subrogation of any person’s right to recovery for personal injuries from a third person. Generally, there is no subrogation for medical expenses in personal injury in Virginia.

Exceptions to this general rule, include all state and federal benefits plans (Medicaid, Medicare, VCUHS, and other State Hospitals, etc.), worker’s compensation and ERISA plans for companies that are fully self-insured.

If you have been charged with a crime or you are appealing your conviction, you should contact us immediately.

Hull Street Law
a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 230-4200
(804) 230-4100 fax

Disclaimer

December 8, 2014September 24, 2016

Congratulations to Attorney Jonathan Arthur – 2014 Legal Elite

The firm’s associate Jonathan Arthur were recognized by Virginia Business in 2014 as Legal Elite.

September 15, 2013June 2, 2019

Virginia DUI Defense – Free Consultation

804-230-4200
VIRGINIA DUI DEFENSE – CALL FOR FREE CONSULTATION

At Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C., we realize the seriousness of being arrested for DUI, or DWI as it is sometimes referred to. When you are in need of a capable Virginia, DUI lawyer, count on Hull Street Law for strong and effective legal counsel. Even if it is your first offense, you are facing a mandatory minimum fine of $250 and possible jail time depending on your blood alcohol level. Penalties become increasingly harsh with every subsequent offense. Our Virginia, Va DWI attorneys are skilled in this complex area of the law; we will work to obtain the very best outcome possible on your behalf.

In the Commonwealth of Virginia, there are generally three methods that are used to determine that an individual was intoxicated while operating a vehicle. Your driving behavior (i.e. weaving, driving recklessly, etc.), field sobriety tests and breath/blood alcohol tests are typically used to determine that you were driving while under the influence. Our Virginia DUI lawyers are experienced and knows that these tests are not always perfect, the results not always reliable.

Did the police officer have reasonable suspicion to pull you over? The results of field sobriety tests are not always indisputable, and there are many problems with breath/blood tests. The individual who administers these tests must be licensed; tests must be handled properly. Results are not always accurate. Your Va DWI attorney will know how to challenge the evidence against you, and build a strong defense if it becomes necessary to go to court.

Being convicted on charges of driving while intoxicated can negatively impact your life in many ways. Not only are the fines steep, your reputation or career may be affected. Many employers do not want an employee on their payroll who has a criminal record. Your insurance rates will likely increase; if you are a repeat offender, your insurance provider may drop coverage altogether. Your license will be suspended, and you will need to get a restricted license so that you can drive under certain circumstances, such as to go to and from work or school. A trusted Va DUI attorney can explain all of the details to you, and answer any questions you may have.

Whether you are innocent or guilty of the charges leveled against you, it is critical that you have a qualified Va DWI lawyer on your side. This is a serious criminal offense, and one that requires legal support and guidance. An experienced attorney will work to have the charges against you reduced so that the consequences you face are less severe, or to have them completely dismissed when possible. At Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C., with two offices in the Capital of Virginia, our Va DWI lawyers are aggressive and skilled, ready to do whatever is necessary to protect your rights, reputation and freedom. Contact one of our VIRGINIA DUI lawyers today for a free consultation:

ONLINE CONTACT INQUIRY FORM

804-230-4200
DUI DEFENSE – CALL FOR FREE CONSULTATION

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August 25, 2013January 3, 2019

Expungement of Police and Court Record in Virginia

Expungement of Police and Court Record in Virginia

An arrest for a criminal offense can have a devastating impact on your life, including, but not limited to, termination from your job, denial of future employment, loss or denial of financial aid for college, and loss of your home. Therefore, it is vital to ensure that police and court records accurately reflect your criminal history. You should take steps to expunge (“remove”) any inaccuracies and/or incidents that overstate your criminal history. You should take steps to expunge charges for which you were not convicted.

In many states, a person previously convicted of a criminal offense is eligible to expunge the record of his or her conviction and arrest after the passage of a specified period of time and completion of other statutory requirements (i.e. Illinois, Michigan, Oklahoma, etc.). However, in Virginia, one’s eligibility for expungement is severely limited. The most noteworthy of these limitations is that an individual cannot seek an expungement for an offense for which he or she has pled guilty, received a dismissal based upon a deferred disposition, or for which he or she was convicted.

Under Virginia Code § 19.2-392.2, a person qualifies for an expungement if he or she is acquitted of a criminal offense, the Commonwealth takes a nolle prosequi (Latin for “be unwilling to pursue” or “will not prosecute”) the criminal charge, or “is otherwise dismissed.” Additionally, a person is eligible for an expungement of a criminal offense upon presenting evidence to the court that the criminal charge arose as a result of identity theft. Again, please note that Virginia law does not permit expungement of offenses for which an individual pled guilty, was convicted, or received a dismissal upon completion of the terms of a deferred disposition where there is a finding of guilt.

In Necaise v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 666, 708 S.E.2d 864 (2011), the court held that a defendant cannot have a felony charge expunged when he pleads guilty to a lesser-included misdemeanor offense. Id., 281 Va. at 669, 708 S.E.2d at 866. However when a person is convicted of a misdemeanor that is not a lesser included offense, an expungement may be possible, but it will be important to establish that the plead is not a “bargain”– the person must show that he was in fact not guilty and not just taking a deal.

“When considering a petition for expungement of police and court records relating to a criminal charge, ‘the threshold determination . . . is whether the petitioner has a right to seek expungement of those records under an applicable provision of Code § 19.2-392.2(A).’” Brown v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 92, 98-99, 677 S.E.2d 220, 223 (2009) (quoting Daniel v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 523, 530, 604 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2004)). Under that Code section, expungement of a criminal record is ordinarily permitted in three circumstances: 1) if a person is “acquitted” of a crime; 2) the criminal offense is ended by nolle prosequi; or 3) the charge is “otherwise dismissed.” See § 19.2-392.2(A)(1)-(2). “In any proceeding for expungement, the petitioner has the burden of establishing the existence of one of those three criteria as a prerequisite to his right to seek expungement.” Eastlack v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 120, 123, 710 S.E.2d 723, 724 (2011). “After concluding that a petitioner has the right to seek expungement under Code § 19.2-392.2(A), a circuit court must then determine whether ‘the continued existence and possible dissemination of information relating to the arrest of the petitioner causes or may cause circumstances which constitute a manifest injustice to the petitioner.’” Brown, 278 Va. at 103, 677 S.E.2d at 226 (quoting Code § 19.2-392.2(F)).

Ordinarily, the process for obtaining an expungement is fairly straightforward. Nonetheless, the legal process and procedure can be quite daunting. Therefore, if you are seeking an expungement, you should hire an experienced attorney to represent and guide you through the process. Mistakes can make the difference between a successful expungement and an unjustified criminal offense remaining on your record.

Call

HULL STREET LAW
at
804-230-4200
to set up your initial consultation today.

Contact the Firm!

Thomas H. Roberts, Esquire

Hull Street Law
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 230-4200 x 110

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June 10, 2013February 4, 2023

Can a police officer order everyone out of the vehicle during a traffic stop?

Q. Can a police officer order everyone out of the vehicle during a traffic stop?
A. Yes.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, this rule is enforced by requiring police officers to obtain warrants in order to search or seize people. However, the Supreme Court of the United States has added many exceptions to the warrant requirement. Additionally, it has expanded the bounds of “reasonableness” in several areas where it has decided that a person’s right to privacy must be balanced with the fact that police officers have an inherently unsafe occupation.

In the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968) the Court carved out an exception to the warrant requirement which allows officers to briefly detain people for investigative purposes when there is an reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. These stops are known as “Terry Stops.” During these stops, if the officer has some reasonable articulable suspicion that the person may be armed and dangerous, the officer may perform a brief, over-the-clothes pat down of the person. This pat down is known as a “frisk.”

In Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 784 (2009), the court stated that once a law enforcement officer has conducted a valid traffic stop, the officer is justified in conducting a frisk of the person for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects that the person stopped is armed and dangerous. Id. Commonwealth v. Smith, 281 Va. 582, 589 (2011).

[I]n a traffic-stop setting, the first Terry condition — a lawful investigatory stop–is met whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, just as in the case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal activity, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.

Id.

In Arizona v. Johnson, the Court summarized the expanded rule from Terry as it applies to traffic stops:

Three decisions cumulatively portray Terry’s application in a traffic-stop setting: Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); and Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).

In Mimms, the Court held that “once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.” 434 U.S., at 111, n. 6.

Wilson held that the Mimms rule applied to passengers as well as to drivers. Specifically, the Court instructed that “an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.” 519 U.S. at 415.

It is true, the Court acknowledged, that in a lawful traffic stop, “[t]here is probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a minor vehicular offense,” but “there is no such reason to stop or detain the passengers.” Id. On the other hand, the Court emphasized, the risk of a violent encounter in a traffic-stop setting “stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.” Id., at 414. “[T]he motivation of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime,” the Court stated, “is every bit as great as that of the driver.” Ibid. Moreover, the Court noted, “as a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle,” id., at 413-414, so “the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal,” id., at 415.

Completing the picture, Brendlin held that a passenger is seized, just as the driver is, “from the moment [a car stopped by the police comes] to a halt on the side of the road.” 551 U.S., at 263. A passenger therefore has standing to challenge a stop’s constitutionality. Id., at 256-259.

After Wilson, but before Brendlin, the Court had stated, in dictum, that officers who conduct “routine traffic stop[s]” may “perform a ‘patdown’ of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-118 (1998). That forecast, we now confirm, accurately captures the combined thrust of the Court’s decisions in Mimms, Wilson, and Brendlin.

The answer is clear that an officer can order all occupants of a vehicle out of the car pending the completion of the stop if the initial stop was lawful. The reasoning behind these rules is almost always the same: officer safety. What is not so clear is what the officer can do then.

For example, officers are limited in their right to frisk the occupants of the vehicle. They are also limited in how much and what kind of investigations they can complete during the course of the stop. Finally, even if an officer can arrest an individual, there are limits on how much force the officer can use in the process of the arrest.

The rules governing the protection of citizens from unreasonable search and seizure are, at best, vague. If you are charged with a crime and feel that a police officer has violated your right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, call an experienced criminal defense attorney today.

For traffic or criminal defense in Virginia – Contact Hull Street Law!

Hull Street Law
a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-230-4200