Can I represent myself?

In Virginia, you can represent yourself in court. (You cannot represent your limited liability company or corporation except for limited exceptions in General District Court; You cannot represent your children, your spouse or others)

It is often not wise to represent yourself – but you still have that right.

In criminal cases, you have a 5th Amendment right to remain silent, which is hard to do when you are representing yourself!!!

However, if you decide to represent yourself, you may find some helpful tips here.

Virginia Civil Rights Lawyers

Civil Rights In Virginia – Upheld By Virginia’s Highest Court – 2020

Virginia’s Highest Court Confirm’s That It Will Not Tolerate Virginia Law Enforcement Violations Of  The 4th Amendment To The U.S. Constitution Or Virginia Statutes Protecting Its Citizens from Unlawful Arrests, Unlawful Searches and Excessive Force.

Ms. Cromartie

On January 16, 2020, the Virginia Supreme Court issued an opinion reversing the Circuit Court for the City of Petersburg which rejected federal civil rights claims and a unlawful search claim of Monica Cromartie, finding that Petersburg Police Officer Brian Lee Billings is liable for violations of an unlawful search under Virginia Code § 19.2-59, for false arrest under 42 USC § 1983 and excessive force claims under 42 USC § 1983 and remanding the case for a determination of compensatory and punitive damages, an award of costs, interest, and attorneys’ fees.

Ms. Cromartie4

In this case, Monica Cromartie, an African American woman was stopped for speeding. A simple matter involving a traffic infraction went terribly wrong. When Ms. Cromartie got out of the car protesting, Officer Brian Lee Billings directed her to get back in her car and shut the door, which she did. Ms. Cromartie was a 54 year-old woman weighing about 100 pounds and standing about 4’ 9 inches. After backup arrived, Officer Billings approached the vehicle while Ms. Cromartie was vigorously protesting to somebody else on her cellphone, when he knocked on her window. She replied “What” but continued her protest into her cell-phone. When Billings stated “I need you to roll down your window” and “Ma’am” knocking on the window a second time, she stated “Hey officer, leave me alone.” With a mere seconds passing, Officer Billings overreacted in a hostile and violent fashion, opened the driver’s door and ripped Ms. Cromartie from the car and forced her face-down onto the payment and placed his weight on her back with such force that he injured Ms. Cromartie’s forehead, teeth, lip, right eye and right knee before she was handcuffed and then shackled by the legs by other officers. Officer Billings testified under oath to the magistrate that he “opened the car door, instructed her to get out” which the police videos did not support in order to obtain a warrant for obstruction of justice against her which was later dismissed.  The court found the fact that a neutral magistrate issued a warrant was not in this case a clear indication that an officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner, stating “when ‘it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue,’ the “shield of immunity” otherwise conferred by the warrant will be lost.’”


Jonathan Arthur and Andrew Bodoh, attorneys with the civil rights law firm of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC represented her in a civil jury trial in Petersburg where the jury determined that Officer Billings had in fact assaulted and battered, falsely imprisoned and maliciously prosecuted Ms. Cromartie on charges of obstruction of justice.   However, the trial court ruled that the jury did not get to decide the state law claim of the unlawful search or the federal law claims of the 4th Amendment violations because it ruled that Officer Billings was legally immune from such claims.  The law firm appealed the denial of the Circuit Court to submit to the jury the claims for an unlawful search that followed the unlawful arrest, together with the constitutional claims.  Attorney Jonathan Arthur argued the case to the Virginia Supreme Court.

Andrew Bodoh, Esq. 804-783-2000 x 110
Andrew Bodoh, Esq.

On April 20, 1871 congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” as a remedy to protect citizens who were denied federal and U.S. Constitutional rights.  Later, 42 USC § 1983 incorporated the act to provide a remedy for violations.  In 1976, congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, which became 42 U.S.C. § 1988, explicitly providing for attorneys’ fees to continue to enable law firm’s like Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC to be reimbursed for the high costs of championing the civil rights of people like Ms. Cromartie. Congress was motivated by the fear that civil rights statutes would not be enforced, civil liberties would not be protected, and officers like Billings would remain unaccountable for their actions without private plaintiffs like Cromartie and that the high costs of civil rights litigation would discourage plaintiffs like Cromartie from bringing civil rights suits. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., note 9, at 1; 6 (1976).

The law firm of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC. has been litigating civil rights and personal injury cases since 1986.  The first firm to obtain a verdict of $1 Million + in the history of Henrico County, the law firm has obtained many significant victories to protect the injured, individual liberties and to protect the civil rights of Virginia’s citizens.

Attorney Tom Roberts

Read the Opinion

Listen to Oral Arguments in the Virginia Supreme Court

Richmond Times Dispatch

Petersburg Progress Index

Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC

105 S 1st Street

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 783-2000

Hull Street Law successful in defense of high profile Dinwiddie County case against former deputy!

Hull Street law handles high profile criminal cases in Central Virginia.

February 7, 2018 – Civil rights attorneys Tom Roberts  successfully defended  former Dinwiddie County Deputy Hector Jimenez in a high profile criminal case.   Mr. Jimenez had been charged with two felonies: taking indecent liberties with a minor in violation of VA Code § 18.2-370(A)(4), with potential imprisonment of between 1 and 10 years, and aggravated sexual battery in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-67.3(A)(4)(a), with potential imprisonment of between 1 and 20 years. On February 7, 2018, the state dropped the charges against Mr. Jimenez.


The prosecutor explained to the court on Wednesday that Mr. Jimenez had hired two very competent and aggressive attorneys that she expected would thoroughly cross-examine the complaining juvenile witness and her father. The prosecutor stated that the juvenile’s father was involved in a contentious custody battle and had a criminal and mental health history.  

The juvenile’s mother was less than 5 feet from Mr. Jimenez and her daughter at the time of the alleged incident.  Three other people were also in the room at the time of the alleged incident.  All were prepared to testify that the allegations were false.   The juvenile’s mother had consistently denied that the incidents took place or that her daughter had ever reported the incidents to her until after the juvenile moved out of the mother’s home.  


The juvenile was never alone with Mr. Jimenez. The allegations were made over 1 ½ years after the alleged incident at a time when a contentious custody battle between the juvenile’s parents was on the horizon.  The girl’s mother had dated Mr. Jimenez for only about 5 weeks.


Mr. Jimenez had numerous reputation witnesses, ready to tell the jury of his strong reputation, and his squeaky clean service both in the military and in law enforcement.


The firm stated, “Our client maintained his innocence throughout and was prepared to defend his reputation and to present credible witnesses at trial who would have testified that they were present and the incidents as alleged did not occur.”  Attorney Roberts stated, “It is important to remember that the law holds all defendants innocent until proven otherwise by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We are committed to holding the government to this high standard that separates us from uncivilized and totalitarian societies.  This is the reason that we have earned a reputation for being competent and aggressive.”


Tom Roberts, Esq.

Attorney Tom Roberts, Esq.

Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC

105 S 1st Street

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 783-2000 x 105 

Axiom Mediation Group

Hull Street Law encourages mediation, a voluntary process by which the parties to a dispute with the help of a skilled mediator crafts their own resolution instead of relying upon a judge or jury who rarely have or understand all of the facts to do so.  Hull Street Law recommends Axiom Mediation Group in Central Virginia when you need mediation!

Hull Street Law recommends Axiom Mediation!

Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Virginia – Legal Defense

The facts and circumstances of each case are unique and therefore the fact that a law firm has obtained significant verdicts and results in other cases in no way guarantees that other cases will have similar results.

I’ve been charged with “possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Virginia,” I need a good criminal defense attorney who handles possession of a firearm cases by a convicted felon.


Using Old Chief to exclude the name and nature of a substantially similar offenses in a Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon case.


Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Va Code § 18.2-308.2 is one of the most devastating class 6 felonies an individual can be charged with in Virginia.  Not just because a second amendment right has been taken away from the person, but because you can face mandatory minimum time.  If you are charged with this crime and your prior felony occurred in the last 10 years, you must serve a minimum of two years if convicted.  If you were convicted of a violent felony as defined in Va Code § 17.1-805 at any time prior to being charged with this offense and you are subsequently convicted, then you will automatically receive the maximum punishment for a class 6 felony…5 years!

The Commonwealth has the burden to prove (1) that the defendant was convicted of a felony under any state or federal law and (2) that the defendant was in possession of a firearm or stun weapon as defined in 18.2-308.1 or explosive materials.  The first element of a felony conviction is typically a foregone conclusion and the Commonwealth can prove this introducing the indictment of the charge including what the charge was and when and where it occurred.

Under Va. Rule of Evidence 2:403 the court has the discretion to exclude evidence that would be substantially more prejudicial than probative.  While evidence is rarely excluded on this basis, particularly when introducing evidence of a required element of the offense, in the case of a possession of a firearm by convicted felon, a prior felony offense of a similar nature could certainly impact the jury in an unfairly prejudicial way.  ESPECIALLY, IF THE PRIOR CONVICTION WAS A POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A CONVICTED FELON!

In Old Chief v. United States, the United Sates Supreme Court was asked to address whether the particulars of a conviction are admissible in a firearm felon case, given an offer by the defense to stipulate to the fact that the defendant is a convicted felon.  The Court found that, given an offer to stipulate, the probative value of the particulars of the conviction was discounted and substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  The risk of unfair prejudice can vary from case to case but… “[w]here a prior conviction was for a gun crime or one similar to other charges in a pending case the risk of unfair prejudice would be especially obvious…” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997).

I had a recent case where it appeared that this issue had not been directly addressed in Virginia with respect to an offer to stipulate (see Boone v. Commonwealth 285 Va. 597 (2013)), and all negative case law preceded Old Chief (see Glover v. Commonwealth 285 Va. 597 (1986); see also Essex v. Commonwealth (18 Va. App. 168 (1994)).  After consulting with colleagues at the Richmond Public Defender’s office, I filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to the specifics of the prior conviction (which in my case was a federal firearm felon conviction). After review of the case law and brief oral argument, the court in my case found that Old Chief was very much on point and extremely persuasive and thus granted the motion and advised us to agree on an appropriate stipulation with the Commonwealth.

While it may initially seem unwise to concede an element of the crime, as I stated earlier, the fact that the defendant was a convicted felon was a foregone conclusion that would be easily proven by the Commonwealth.  The exclusion of the specifics of his prior felony meant that the jury could not see that the defendant was previously convicted of a similar crime in federal court ten years earlier.  There is no doubt that this information would have been extremely prejudicial to the client.  Once we were able to keep the specifics of his conviction out of evidence and focus simply on whether he was in possession of a firearm on that specific day, the case leaned more in our favor because the jury could not be distracted by the fact that he’d been convicted of the same offense in federal court.

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence and after closing statements, within 30 minutes the jury returned a not guilty verdict and freed my client from the burden of a 5 year mandatory sentence.  There is no doubt in my mind that had the jury learned that he had been convicted of a federal firearm charge previously, this would have been a much more difficult case.


If you have been charged with a crime or you are appealing your conviction, you should contact us immediately.

Hull Street Law
a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, PC
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 230-4200


The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice and you should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney.  Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

Freaky Friday Halloween Decision – Drink and operate your car radio on your property may result in DUI conviction

Freaky Friday Halloween Decision by the Virginia Supreme Court.  The public is mystified by what it considers a new legal absurdity – Listening to your car radio in a private driveway while drinking is illegal and may result in a DUI conviction! Sarafin v. Commonwealth, October 31, 2014.

The odd conclusion in this DUI case is the result of the court’s deference to the General Assembly.  Rather than concluding that the General Assembly occasionally does a poor job drafting legislation, the court does its best to interpret the statute which from time to time results in legal absurdities.  The court bases its decision on rules of statutory construction.  The court states “[W]hen the General Assembly has used specific language in one instance, but omits that language or uses different language when addressing a similar subject elsewhere in the  Code, we must presume that the difference in the choice of language was intentional.”   This might have been a time where the presumption should have been rebutted.

The court declined to read § 18.2-266 (the DUI statute) to require that an operator of a motor vehicle be “on a highway” refusing to apply the legislative definition of “operator” under § 46.2-100 that defines “operator” as “every person who either (1) drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway or (ii) is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.”

The reason for rejecting this definition is that to do so would result in a separate absurdity.  § 18.2-266 reads in part, “It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train (i) while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more by weight by volume…”  The court points out that trains do not operate on public highways but on privately owned tracks and therefore reading in the “on a highway” language would make the trains provision meaningless.  (Unless of course the statute only restricts drunk train operating when the track intersects with public highways).

Secondly, in 1994, the General Assembly amended § 18.2-266, prohibiting the operation of “mopeds, … on the public highways of this Commonwealth” while the operator is intoxicated, and therefore since § 18.2-266 when referring to an automobile, it does not state “on the public highways of this Commonwealth” for operating “ it must have meant to differentiate the two.

The decision was split 4-3, with a very vocal dissent.   Justice Mims dissenting stated that the court had previously recognized the nexus or connection between § 46.2-100 and § 18.2-266 in Enriquez v. Commonwealth in 2012 when the court stated that “when an intoxicated person is seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle on a public highway and the key is in the ignition switch, he is in actual physical control of the vehicle and, therefore, is guilty of operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266.”  Without [the element of ‘on a public highway’], the Court has taken the final step toward construing Code § 18.2-266 to punish a person for merely occupying, rather than operating, a motor vehicle.”  Justice McClanahan, joined by Chief Justice Kinser also dissented, stating that the “on a highway” element has been the Court’s interpretation as far back as 1964, for similar reasons as Justice Mims.


You need experienced counsel.  You should contact a lawyer with Hull Street Law today.   Call 804-230-4200.

Hull Street Law
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804.230.4100 fax


 The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice.  You should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney.  Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

Virginia DUI Defense – Free Consultation


At Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C., we realize the seriousness of being arrested for DUI, or DWI as it is sometimes referred to.  When you are in need of a capable Virginia, DUI lawyer, count on Hull Street Law for strong and effective legal counsel.  Even if it is your first offense, you are facing a mandatory minimum fine of $250 and possible jail time depending on your blood alcohol level.  Penalties become increasingly harsh with every subsequent offense.  Our Virginia, Va DWI attorneys are skilled in this complex area of the law; we will work to obtain the very best outcome possible on your behalf.

In the Commonwealth of Virginia, there are generally three methods that are used to determine that an individual was intoxicated while operating a vehicle.  Your driving behavior (i.e. weaving, driving recklessly, etc.), field sobriety tests and breath/blood alcohol tests are typically used to determine that you were driving while under the influence.  Our Virginia DUI lawyers are experienced and knows that these tests are not always perfect, the results not always reliable.

Did the police officer have reasonable suspicion to pull you over?  The results of field sobriety tests are not always indisputable, and there are many problems with breath/blood tests.  The individual who administers these tests must be licensed; tests must be handled properly.  Results are not always accurate.  Your Va DWI attorney will know how to challenge the evidence against you, and build a strong defense if it becomes necessary to go to court.

Being convicted on charges of driving while intoxicated can negatively impact your life in many ways.  Not only are the fines steep, your reputation or career may be affected.  Many employers do not want an employee on their payroll who has a criminal record.  Your insurance rates will likely increase; if you are a repeat offender, your insurance provider may drop coverage altogether.  Your license will be suspended, and you will need to get a restricted license so that you can drive under certain circumstances, such as to go to and from work or school.  A trusted Va DUI attorney can explain all of the details to you, and answer any questions you may have.

Whether you are innocent or guilty of the charges leveled against you, it is critical that you have a qualified Va DWI lawyer on your side.  This is a serious criminal offense, and one that requires legal support and guidance. An experienced attorney will work to have the charges against you reduced so that the consequences you face are less severe, or to have them completely dismissed when possible.  At Hull Street Law, a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C., with two offices in the Capital of Virginia, our Va DWI lawyers are aggressive and skilled, ready to do whatever is necessary to protect your rights, reputation and freedom.  Contact one of our VIRGINIA DUI lawyers today for a free consultation:




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What you need to know if you are being sued by your Homeowner’s Association

Are you being sued by your Homeowner’s Association?

Many people find themselves in trouble with their Homeowner’s Associations (“HOA”). Often times, it’s a simple thing like forgetting to pay the annual assessment on time. Other times, there are larger issues such as a patriotic former Marine attempting to fly the Stars and Stripes on his own property. Whatever the case may be, when a conflict arises between you and your HOA, you don’t have to take it lying down.

The rules governing the creation and operations of HOAs are complex. In Virginia, those rules are mostly embodied in The Virginia Property Owner’s Association Act (the “VPOAA” or “the Act”) Va. Code §55-508 et seq. This act regulates everything from which neighborhoods are subject to the VPOAA to what has to be included in a disclosure package at the time you purchase your home, to who has access to the association’s records. However, this act has also be supplemented and explained by case law from the Virginia Supreme Court. The complexity of this area of the law, which combines the law of contracts, real property, statutory construction, and state constitutional law requires an attorney with experience.

Any measure of non-compliance with the act, on the part of your HOA, may give you a leverage point. This sounds like a thin defense, but the consequences of non-compliance can be catastrophic for the HOA. For example, in one case the law firm recently handled, the HOA sued our clients (and nearly 30 of their neighbors) for back assessments. When the firm reviewed the case, it found that the non-compliance with the act was so significant that it threw the HOA out of the VPOAA altogether. That became the core point in our defense. This aggressive defense made continuing the lawsuit very risky for the HOA. Ultimately, the HOA backed down because if it had lost the case it would have been hard pressed in future cases to claim that it was an HOA under the Act.   For most of the other neighbors not represented by the firm, the HOA took judgments against them.

If you are sued by your homeowner’s association, you don’t have to merely pay up. You may have defenses of which you are unaware.

to set up your initial consultation today.

Contact the Firm!

Hull Street Law
1010 Hull Street
Richmond, Virginia 23224
(804) 230-4200


The facts and circumstances of each case are unique and therefore the fact that a law firm has obtained significant verdicts and results in other cases in no way guarantees that other cases will have similar results.

The materials are prepared for information purposes only.  The materials are not legal advice and you should not act upon the information without seeking the advice of an attorney. Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship.

Can a police officer order everyone out of the vehicle during a traffic stop?

Q. Can a police officer order everyone out of the vehicle during a traffic stop?
A. Yes.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, this rule is enforced by requiring police officers to obtain warrants in order to search or seize people. However, the Supreme Court of the United States has added many exceptions to the warrant requirement. Additionally, it has expanded the bounds of “reasonableness” in several areas where it has decided that a person’s right to privacy must be balanced with the fact that police officers have an inherently unsafe occupation.

In the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968) the Court carved out an exception to the warrant requirement which allows officers to briefly detain people for investigative purposes when there is an reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  These stops are known as “Terry Stops.”   During these stops, if the officer has some reasonable articulable suspicion that the person may be armed and dangerous, the officer may perform a brief, over-the-clothes pat down of the person. This pat down is known as a “frisk.”

In Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 784 (2009), the court stated that once a law enforcement officer has conducted a valid traffic stop, the officer is justified in conducting a frisk of the person for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.  Id.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 281 Va. 582, 589 (2011).

[I]n a traffic-stop setting, the first Terry condition — a lawful investigatory stop–is met whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, just as in the case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal activity, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.


In  Arizona v. Johnson,  the Court summarized the expanded rule from Terry as it applies to traffic stops:

Three decisions cumulatively portray Terry’s application in a traffic-stop setting: Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); and Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).

In Mimms, the Court held that “once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.” 434 U.S., at 111, n. 6.

Wilson held that the Mimms rule applied to passengers as well as to drivers. Specifically, the Court instructed that “an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.” 519 U.S. at 415.

It is true, the Court acknowledged, that in a lawful traffic stop, “[t]here is probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a minor vehicular offense,” but “there is no such reason to stop or detain the passengers.” Id. On the other hand, the Court emphasized, the risk of a violent encounter in a traffic-stop setting “stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.” Id., at 414. “[T]he motivation of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime,” the Court stated, “is every bit as great as that of the driver.” Ibid. Moreover, the Court noted, “as a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle,” id., at 413-414, so “the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal,” id., at 415.

Completing the picture, Brendlin held that a passenger is seized, just as the driver is, “from the moment [a car stopped by the police comes] to a halt on the side of the road.” 551 U.S., at 263. A passenger therefore has standing to challenge a stop’s constitutionality. Id., at 256-259.

After Wilson, but before Brendlin, the Court had stated, in dictum, that officers who conduct “routine traffic stop[s]” may “perform a ‘patdown’ of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-118 (1998). That forecast, we now confirm, accurately captures the combined thrust of the Court’s decisions in Mimms, Wilson, and Brendlin.

The answer is clear that an officer can order all occupants of a vehicle out of the car pending the completion of the stop if the initial stop was lawful. The reasoning behind these rules is almost always the same: officer safety. What is not so clear is what the officer can do then.

For example, officers are limited in their right to frisk the occupants of the vehicle. They are also limited in how much and what kind of investigations they can complete during the course of the stop. Finally, even if an officer can arrest an individual, there are limits on how much force the officer can use in the process of the arrest.

The rules governing the protection of citizens from unreasonable search and seizure are, at best, vague. If you are charged with a crime and feel that a police officer has violated your right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, call an experienced criminal defense attorney today.

For traffic or criminal defense in Virginia – Contact Hull Street Law!

Hull Street Law
a division of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C.
105 S 1st Street, Suite H
Richmond, Virginia 23219